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  INTRODUCTION   
Of the many recent changes in the legal-regulatory regimes 
affecting financial institutions, the advent of stress testing as a 
key regulatory tool deserves special attention on account of its 
novelty and unique potential.1
 
 1. See Chester S. Spatt, Regulatory Conflict: Market Integrity vs. Finan-
cial Stability, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 625, 627 (2010) (“One of the most interesting 
innovations to emerge in the bank supervision model during the financial 
market crisis is the use of stress tests.”); Patrick Jenkins & Brooke Masters, 
Again Under Strain, FIN. TIMES, Jul. 8, 2011, at 7 (“[S]ince the financial crisis 
 To most Americans—and indeed, 
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to most lawyers—the mention of a stress test likely prompts 
thoughts of a visit to the cardiologist before it suggests any-
thing about the financial system.2
In a broad and interdisciplinary sense, a stress test is any 
analytic exercise designed to gauge how changes in variables, 
usually of a dramatic or “stressed” nature, affect a test subject 
in ways that are relevant to the subject’s performance, and in 
particular its susceptibility to failure. Ultimately, the purpose 
of any stress test is to gain familiarity with the means by which 
those variables negatively impact the behavior of the test sub-
ject.
 Those trained in engineering 
will have a different view of stress testing in mind involving the 
study of how physical objects such as bridges or airplane wings 
respond to applied forces. The multitude of disciplinary con-
texts in which stress testing concepts have gained currency tes-
tifies to the general usefulness of stress as a diagnostic tool. For 
those involved in financial markets, the appeal is intuitive: af-
ter an epochal series of stressed market events convulsed fi-
nancial markets and systems at the end of the previous decade, 
of course it is advisable for regulators and firms to spend more 
time thinking about stress. However, this intuitive appeal pre-
sents a potential problem if, in their effort to incorporate stress 
testing into regulatory regimes, lawmakers and regulators 
overzealously clump together techniques and models of stress 
testing without taking account of how they diverge in im-
portant ways.  
3
 
. . . stress-testing [has] become a vital part of the regulatory arsenal.”). 
 In the financial area, stress tests can helps us to under-
stand how an institution or system would respond to severe, yet 
plausible, stressed market conditions such as low economic 
output, high unemployment, stock market crashes, liquidity 
 2. Cardiology stress tests were frequently invoked by analogy after the 
announcement that U.S. banking regulators would be conducting stress tests 
at the 19 largest U.S. bank holding companies in connection with the Treas-
ury’s Supervisory Capital Assessment Program. See Press Release, Timothy 
Geithner, U.S. Treas. Sec’y, Secretary Geithner Introduces Financial Stability 
Plan (Feb. 10, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press 
-releases/Pages/tg18.aspx (“First, we’re going to require banking institutions 
to go through a carefully designed comprehensive stress test, to use the medi-
cal term.”); David Wessel, Bank Checkup Also Tests Regulators, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 16, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB123983475012122683 (“In 
medicine, a stress test is when the doctor puts you on a treadmill to check your 
heart. . . . Today, the stress test the [U.S. regulators] are conducting at the na-
tion’s largest banks is more than a test of the patients’ health. It is a test of 
the government’s ability to restore confidence . . . .”). 
 3. See, e.g., AUGUSTO J. DURELLI, APPLIED STRESS ANALYSIS, at xii 
(1967). 
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shortages, high default rates, and failures of large counterpar-
ties.4 The results of stress tests shed light on the tension points 
and weak links in portfolios and systems that could create ex-
traordinary but plausible losses.5
Stress testing in the financial industry has been a key 
component of financial firms’ internal risk management de-
partments for decades.
  
6
Before presenting a normative case for how policymakers 
should design the law and regulation of stress testing, this Ar-
ticle undertakes three descriptive tasks to better understand 
the diverse set of techniques labeled as stress tests. First, it 
briefly describes the origins of stress testing practices in the 
engineering discipline as the study of how structures and sys-
tems experience failure. By placing stress tests in their histori-
cal and conceptual context, their purposes and promises should 
become clearer. Second, it presents a rough typology of finan-
cial stress test techniques and discusses the distinctions among 
them, highlighting in particular the extent of their reliance on 
hands-on management involvement and the usage of quantita-
tive statistical models that have come to predominate in finan-
cial risk management. Financial firm risk managers conduct a 
varied array of exercises that fit the stress test label, including 
sensitivity analysis, hypothetical scenario analysis, historical 
simulation, “war game” direct event simulation, and “reverse” 
stress tests. Regulators also conduct their own stress tests of 
the financial system or individual institutions, either on an ad 
hoc or periodic basis. Third, it surveys the law and regulation of 
stress testing up to the present.  
 What is new, however, is the zeal with 
which lawmakers and regulators have looked to stress testing 
as a regulatory technique. As lawmakers have increasingly 
emphasized stress testing as a tool of bank regulation, they 
have failed to elaborate several fundamental distinctions 
among stress testing techniques and programs. Only with a 
proper understanding of its purposes and limitations is a stress 
testing regulatory program likely to prove an effective policy 
tool.  
 
 4. See Mathias Drehmann, Stress Tests: Objectives, Challenges and Mod-
eling Choices, 2 SVERIGES RIKSBANK ECON. REV. 60, 63 (2008). 
 5. See PHILIPPE JORION, FINANCIAL RISK MANAGER HANDBOOK 266–68 
(5th ed. 2009). 
 6. See, e.g., MICHEL CROUHY ET AL., RISK MANAGEMENT 232–40 (2001); 
JAMES T. GLEASON, RISK: THE NEW MANAGEMENT IMPERATIVE IN FINANCE 
190–93 (2000); GRP. OF THIRTY, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICE AND PRINCIPLES 11–
12 (1993); DAVID SHIRREFF, DEALING WITH FINANCIAL RISK 38 (2004). 
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The Article also makes two theoretical contributions. First, 
it develops an overarching distinction between two alternative 
institutional orientations towards stress testing that has large-
ly escaped scrutiny: assurance-oriented stress testing versus de-
liberation-oriented stress testing. These disparate orientations 
characterize the corporate governance structures and firm atti-
tudinal settings within which the different stress testing tech-
niques, discussed above, are put to use. It goes on to argue that 
the latter in particular holds great promise to counteract some 
of the trenchant problems in contemporary finance. Second, it 
presents a three-part framework, summarized below, to guide 
efforts to implement a regulatory regime that encourages delib-
eration-oriented stress testing.  
When using stress testing as an assurance tool, banks—or 
regulators in coordination with banks—assume a partial equi-
librium model of the financial system; privilege static scenarios; 
draw from audit culture; rely on historical precedents in setting 
scenarios; examine test variables in isolation; require precise 
estimation; design tests with compliance and verification con-
cerns in mind; and emphasize the communicative function of 
the tests. A recent, salient example of assurance-oriented stress 
testing was the highly publicized stress testing program con-
ducted by the U.S. government in 2009, labeled the Supervisory 
Capital Assessment Program (SCAP). The SCAP exercise sub-
jected the nineteen largest U.S. bank holding companies to 
stress tests designed to gauge likely losses through 2010 given 
a “baseline” scenario and a “more adverse” scenario.7
These limitations emerge most clearly when assurance-
oriented stress testing is compared with the second, and more 
promising, orientation towards stress testing, which I label de-
liberation-oriented stress testing. Deliberation-oriented stress 
testing privileges dynamic scenarios; draws from business op-
erations culture; relies on imagination; considers the interactiv-
ity of tested variables; remains open to uncertainty; and is mo-
tivated by governance concerns. In this manifestation, stress 
 This man-
ifestation of stress testing receives the most attention from in-
dustry and commentators, but the familiarity of these uses of 
stress tests disguises some of their limitations.  
 
 7. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: STRESS 
TESTING AND SHORING UP BANK CAPITAL 10–26 (2009); Edmund L. Andrews & 
Eric Dash, Government Offers Details of Bank Stress Test, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/26/business/economy/26banks.html. 
For more on the SCAP stress tests, see infra Part IV.C. 
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testing emerges less as a mechanical assurance tool and more 
as an aspirational internal corporate governance norm. One re-
cent example of a potential deliberation-oriented stress testing 
initiative is subsection (i)(2) of section 165 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, which—without defining stress test or identifying the nec-
essary parameters to stress—requires most banks subject to 
U.S. banking regulation to conduct stress tests on their own.8
The great promise of deliberation-oriented stress testing is 
that it will foster a more mindful decisional infrastructure 
within financial institutions and institutionalize the continuous 
deliberation on failure, catastrophe, and stress. Given the roots 
of stress testing in the engineer’s study of failure modes, it is a 
ready conceptual fit in the context of the financial regulatory 
regime, the primary objectives of which are (1) to prevent fail-
ures in core financial utility functions such as the payment sys-
tem and the monetary policy transmission; and (2) to limit fail-
ures of individual institutions that result in recourse to 
government safety nets.
 
9 Because it affects the corporate gov-
ernance infrastructure of financial institutions, deliberation-
oriented stress testing might facilitate regulatory efforts to 
promote these regulatory objectives under conditions of increas-
ing uncertainty, volatility, and authentic complexity.10
Conceptualizing stress testing regulation as a corporate 
governance matter makes sense. Unlike the physical systems 
with which engineers are concerned, financial professionals and 
regulators must take into account human and organizational 
decision making. And deliberation-oriented stress testing might 
counteract decisional pathologies—such as the disqualification 
  
 
 8. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
§ 165(i), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1430 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365). The 
mandate to conduct internal stress testing pursuant to subsection (i)(2) ap-
plies to (a) financial institutions designated by the Financial Stability Over-
sight Council (FSOC) as systemically significant and (b) bank holding compa-
nies with assets in excess of $10 billion. See id. §§ 113, 165(i). 
 9. See RICHARD S. CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINAN-
CIAL INSTITUTIONS 53–61 (2009). 
 10. See generally Robert Weber, Structural Regulation as Antidote to 
Complexity Capture, 4 AM. BUS. L.J. 643 (2012) (arguing that in many respects 
contemporary financial systems are characterized by complexity rather than 
mere complicatedness and discussing the implications); see also CHRISTINE 
PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION AND DE-
MOCRACY 29 (2002) (“The experience of command and control shows that it is 
not reasonable, practical or efficient for external legislatures and regulators to 
be solely responsible for determining how organizations should manage social 
issues. The design and enforcement of regulation to govern every potential so-
cial dilemma facing business is simply not achievable.”). 
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heuristic, the outcome bias, the overconfidence bias, and the 
hindsight bias—that inhibit organizational learning and una-
voidably affect how capital is allocated throughout the firm. For 
reasons discussed below, these tendencies often result in key 
corporate decision makers overlooking accumulating evidence 
of anomalies, overestimating the validity of their expectations, 
and struggling to distinguish narrowly-avoided catastrophes 
from outright successes. Psychologists have made further re-
cent discoveries that people interpret near-miss events—that 
is, narrowly avoided catastrophes—in ways that actually lower, 
rather than heighten, their perceptions of risk.11
Using public regulatory power to institutionalize delibera-
tion-oriented stress testing within financial firms presents 
unique challenges. The open-ended and indeterminate charac-
ter of its outputs is a poor fit with existing conceptions of ad-
ministrative law. This Article recommends a three-part frame-
work to guide implementation of regulatory systems designed 
to promote deliberation-oriented stress testing. First, regula-
tors should understand their task as involving management-
based regulation—a regulatory approach that acts on corporate 
planning processes rather than specific corporate actions or 
outputs.
 This troubling 
finding suggests the counterintuitive result that narrowly 
avoiding catastrophe makes us less likely to perceive our activi-
ties as risky and might even reduce our ability to engage in 
learning. These decisional pathologies are prevalent in the con-
text of financial firm governance, and are among the most se-
vere threats to financial stability because they inhibit manag-
ers’ and board members’ ability to understand risk. The 
enforced, mandatory deliberation on stress and failure might 
serve as a partial antidote to the tendencies of corporate deci-
sion makers, whether individual or group-level, to overuse heu-
ristics in dangerous ways and to normalize (rather than prob-
lematize) unexpected events that might be weak-signal 
harbingers of future catastrophe.  
12
 
 11. See Robin L. Dillon & Catherine H. Tinsley, How Near-Misses Influ-
ence Decision Making Under Risk: A Missed Opportunity for Learning, 54 
MGMT. SCI. 1425, 1436 (2008). 
 Second, they should encourage the further develop-
ment of the “quantitative skepticism” that Anette Mikes, in her 
field research with bank risk management departments, has 
 12. See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: 
Prescribing Private Management To Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 691, 691 (2003). 
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identified as one of two predominant calculative cultures within 
large financial institutions.13 Deliberation-oriented stress test-
ing will have an easier time gaining traction in a quantitatively 
skeptical risk management department. Third, in their interac-
tions with regulated firms, regulators should draw from the ex-
amples provided by so-called high-reliability organizations 
(HROs) such as nuclear power plants, aircraft carriers, air traf-
fic control systems, and wildfire-fighting units. Management 
and organizational science scholars have lauded the ability of 
HROs to maintain reliable, resilient performance even in condi-
tions of uncertainty and volatility.14 Put another way, the suc-
cess of stress testing as a regulatory tool may well depend on 
whether the regulated institutions implement HRO decision-
making norms throughout the enterprise.15
The effort to build a more mindful decisional infrastructure 
in the corporate governance of financial firms is at bottom 
about building not only technical knowledge but also imagina-
tive capabilities. The nature of this task recalls the recommen-
dation of the so-called 9/11 Commission, charged with making 
suggestions on how to avoid another catastrophic terrorist at-
tack on major domestic infrastructure, that governmental 
agencies “routiniz[e], even bureaucratiz[e], the exercise of im-
agination.”
  
16
 
 13. For an extensive discussion of Mikes’s research, see infra notes 
 The corporate governance dimension of delibera-
tion-oriented stress testing should be similarly conceptualized 
56–58, 
377–87 and accompanying text. 
 14. See CONSTANCE PERIN, SHOULDERING RISKS: THE CULTURE OF CON-
TROL IN THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY, at ix (2005); JOSEPH V. REES, HOS-
TAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE TRANSFORMATION OF NUCLEAR SAFETY SINCE 
THREE MILE ISLAND 123–50 (1994) (discussing learning from the experience of 
Three Mile Island in the nuclear power sector); KARL E. WEICK & KATHLEEN 
M. SUTCLIFFE, MANAGING THE UNEXPECTED: RESILIENT PERFORMANCE IN AN 
AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 1 (2007); Jos A. Rijpma, From Deadlock to Dead End: 
The Normal Accidents—High Reliability Debate Revisited, 11 J. CONTINGEN-
CIES & CRISIS MGMT. 37, 37 (2003). 
 15. Of course, society almost assuredly has a lower risk tolerance for fail-
ure of a nuclear power plant than for a large bank or insurer. The point is not 
that financial institutions are just like nuclear power plants; instead, the point 
is that in both cases failure can impose externalities that justify a regulatory 
intervention into the private ordering of corporate decision making.  
 16. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., FINAL REPORT 
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED 
STATES 344 (2004) [hereinafter 9-11 COMM’N REPORT], available at http:// 
www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf. Analogously, psychologist 
Gary Klein has identified that successful firefighters have rich imaginative 
lives. See GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER: HOW PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS 1–
39 (1998). 
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as an effort to cause financial firms to “expand [their] concep-
tion of the possible” in an effort to better understand the causal 
environments, often characterized by uncertainty and volatili-
ty, that affect the achievement of firm objectives.17
Part I of the Article briefly describes the origins of stress 
testing practices in the engineering discipline. By placing them 
in their historical and conceptual context, the purposes and 
promises of stress testing should become clearer. Part II de-
scribes stress testing in the financial industry, situating such 
techniques within a broader risk management framework of 
which they form a part and introducing a taxonomy of the 
prevalent techniques labeled as “stress tests” in finance. Part 
III elaborates the distinction between assurance-oriented stress 
testing and deliberation-oriented stress testing and argues that 
the latter model holds more promise for promoting financial 
stability. In so doing, it also presents four fictional case studies 
to illustrate differences between these two orientations. Part IV 
sets forth a brief history of the regulation of stress testing prac-
tices of financial institutions and finds that assurance-oriented 
stress testing has, to date, predominated the field. Part V advo-
cates in favor of the three-part framework—resting on the pil-
lars of management-based regulation, quantitative skepticism, 
and high-reliability organization principles—that will serve as 
a useful guide for regulators to promote deliberation-oriented 
stress testing.  
 
I.  ORIGINS OF STRESS TESTING AS THE ANALYSIS OF 
FAILURE   
What is a stress test? The details of the answer to that 
question will depend on the discipline to which you direct the 
question. Nevertheless, common conceptual threads run 
through all applications of stress tests, the most obvious of 
which is a focus on the causes of failure.18 When conducting the 
test, the analyst applies forces to the test object, whether exper-
imentally or analytically, up to or approaching some point of 
failure in order to determine how the forces affect the test ob-
ject’s properties.19
 
 17. Tony Jackson, Turning the Screw Back to 1973—Or Perhaps Further, 
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/93d95d0e-9b7b-11dc 
-8aad-0000779fd2ac.html. 
 Failure, as used in this context, should be 
understood as the non-fulfillment of an objective, and therefore 
 18. See, e.g., DURELLI, supra note 3, at x–xii. 
 19. See, e.g., id.  
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requires consideration of the test object’s purpose. Thus, a mid-
flight fracture of an airplane wing would certainly constitute a 
failure, but so too might a gradual deformation of the wing’s 
edge due to shear stress that does not, at present, compromise 
its ability to fly but which nevertheless could lead to an air dis-
aster if left unrepaired. By better understanding the historical 
genesis of stress testing methodologies, we can situate the con-
temporary uses of stress testing in financial regulation in their 
conceptual context.  
A. STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL ENGINEERING 
This focus on how stress can lead to failure has deep roots 
in the engineering discipline. The first stress tests were per-
formed by the historical predecessors of structural and mechan-
ical engineers, who sought to determine the strength of the ma-
terials they used to build structures.20 Nowadays, the term 
stress connotes any “overpowering pressure of some adverse 
force or influence.”21 When the term is used in financial regula-
tion or legislation, this definition is intended. But for engineers, 
stress has a specialized meaning as a measure of the “intensity 
of the internally distributed forces or components of forces that 
resist a change in the form of a body.”22
Analysis of how things fail contributes to our understand-
ing of how things work. Writing of the advances in scientific 
knowledge during the Scientific Revolution, historian William 
Rosen notes that “understanding didn’t progress by looking for 
truth; it did so by looking for mistakes.”
 
23 Henry Petroski, a 
Duke University engineering professor, applies Rosen’s obser-
vation to his own discipline when he notes that “engineering 
understanding did not progress by looking at successes; it did 
so by looking at failures.”24
 
 20. See ARNOLD W. HENDRY, ELEMENTS OF EXPERIMENTAL STRESS ANAL-
YSIS, at vi (1964). 
 Petroski emphasizes how the engi-
 21. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 885 (2d ed. 1989) (defining 
“stress”). 
 22. See HARMER E. DAVIS ET AL., THE TESTING OF ENGINEERING MATERI-
ALS 17 (4th ed. 1982) (“In mechanical testing, as in the field of mechanics in 
general, we attach rather specific meanings to certain terms, some of which 
are interpreted more loosely in everyday life.”). 
 23. WILLIAM ROSEN, THE MOST POWERFUL IDEA IN THE WORLD: A STORY 
OF STEAM, INDUSTRY, AND INVENTION 68 (2010). 
 24. HENRY PETROSKI, TO FORGIVE DESIGN 87 (2012) (also linking Rosen’s 
observation to the Chinese proverb that “failure is the mother of success”); see 
also Gene I. Rochlin, Informal Organisational Networking as a Crisis-
Avoidance Strategy: US Naval Flight Operations as a Case Study, 3 INDUS. 
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neer’s preoccupation with failure enhances an understanding of 
the causal environments within which structures, products, or 
systems operate: 
In all cases of surprise or failure, the greater technological tragedy is 
not having failures but not learning the correct lessons from them. 
Every failure is a revelation of ignorance, an accidental experiment, a 
found set of data that contains clues that point back to causes and 
further back to mistakes that might have been made in design, manu-
facture, and use. Not to follow the trail to its source is to abandon an 
opportunity to understand better the nature of the technology and our 
interaction with it.25
For this reason, although engineers “are always striving 
for success,” it is nevertheless “imperative that the realistic 
prospect of failure be kept in the forefront of every engineer’s 
mind.”
 
26 As a result of this imperative, engineers are said to be 
“always interested in the worst-case scenario.”27
In the twentieth century, many branches of engineering 
witnessed a methodological drift away from direct experimental 
testing and towards theory and computer-based models.
  
28
 
CRISIS QUART. 159, 170 (1989) (“It is said in the Navy that every lesson is 
‘written in the blood of failures.’”). 
 This 
shift to analytical models and away from direct experimenta-
tion prompted intramural conflicts between those engineers 
who preferred to focus on their computationally sophisticated 
model simulations and those who emphasized instead the need 
for experimental data to verify the model and, more important-
ly, understand better the causal environment—or, in other 
 25. PETROSKI, supra note 24, at 45. 
 26. Id. at 175, 198 (also noting that “failure is seldom far from [engineers’] 
minds”). 
 27. IZURU TAKEWAKIET ET AL., IMPROVING THE EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE 
OF BUILDINGS: THE WORST CASE APPROACH 1 (2013). 
 28. See, e.g., JOSEF SINGER ET AL., BUCKLING EXPERIMENTS: EXPERI-
MENTAL METHODS IN BUCKLING OF THIN-WALLED STRUCTURES 3 (1998); 
Wolfgang G. Knauss, Perspectives in Experimental Solid Mechanics, 37 INT’L 
J. SOLIDS & STRUCTURES 251, 256 (2000). Direct experimentation permits an 
analyst to determine with a high degree of certainty the stress distribution in 
a system or machine component in actual operation without needing to know 
with the same degree of certainty the exact nature of the forces acting on the 
part of system. See MIKLÓS HETÉNYI, HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL STRESS 
ANALYSIS, at v (1950). On the other hand, it sacrifices somewhat the ability to 
individuate the precise causal impact of each contributing force on the tested 
subject. See HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL SOLID MECHANICS, at v (William N. 
Sharpe, Jr. ed., 2008); HETÉNYI, supra at v. Where it is impossible to experi-
ment directly on a test subject, a stress analyst will often construct a smaller 
model and conduct tests based on assumptions regarding the relationship be-
tween the scaled model and the full sized construction it represents. See 
HENDRY, supra note 20, at 1.  
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words, the relevant model parameters—on which the model’s 
structure should depend.29 These debates presaged later con-
flicts in other fields, including finance, about the relative vir-
tues and shortcomings of computer-driven analytical models 
and direct experiments. The point here is that engineering, 
with its demands to understand how causes can trigger failure 
in the real world, could not afford to sidestep this debate. Ana-
lytical theory, along with the computer technologies that facili-
tated its rise, came to co-exist with hard-nosed experimenta-
tion.30
One particular analytical modeling method—the so-called 
Monte Carlo method—is used extensively by engineers and fi-
nancial risk managers, and accordingly bears special mention 
in this context.
  
31 Monte Carlo methods model a system or struc-
ture mathematically, but randomly generate values in a series 
of simulations for the relevant variables that affect the outputs 
of interests to the analyst.32
 
 29. See SINGER ET AL., supra note 
 As a result, Monte Carlo simula-
28, at 5 (“New phenomena have still to 
be found and properly understood in physical tests, before even the powerful 
computers of today can give a reliable simulation and then extend the range of 
parameters.”); Bruce G. Johnston, Buckling Behavior Above the Tangent Mod-
ulus Load, 128 TRANSACTIONS AM. SOC’Y CIVIL ENG’RS 819, 820 (1963) (“There 
are many advantages in simulated tests, carried out with the aid of a comput-
er, in comparison with real tests in an actual testing machine. No machining 
is involved, no materials need be acquired, and there is no scatter in the test 
results!”); Knauss, supra note 28, at 256–57 (comparing over-reliance on ana-
lytical computer models over experimental methods to “aspects of the scholas-
ticism during the 13th century, which fathered the far reaching philosophical 
innovations by Roger Bacon”). 
 30. See HUGH W. COLEMAN & W. GLENN STEELE, EXPERIMENTATION, VAL-
IDATION, AND UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS FOR ENGINEERS 2 (3d ed. 2009) (“Exper-
imental information is almost always required at one or more stages of the 
[analytical] solution process, even when an analytical approach is used. Some-
times experimental results are necessary before realistic assumptions and 
idealizations can be made so that a mathematical model of the real-world pro-
cess can be formulated using the basic laws of physics. In addition, experimen-
tally determined information is generally present in the form of physical prop-
erty values and the auxiliary equations . . . necessary for obtaining a 
solution.”). 
 31. Monte Carlo simulations are so named because the method of generat-
ing random numbers resembles a “roulette-like machine of the kind utilized in 
the gambling Casinos of the Monte Carlo Principate.” ENRICO ZIO, THE MONTE 
CARLO SIMULATION METHOD FOR SYSTEM RELIABILITY AND RISK ANALYSIS 1 
(2013). A late nineteenth century mathematician named John William Strutt 
Rayleigh invented basic Monte Carlo modeling techniques under the name 
“random walks.” See DIMITRIS N. CHORAFAS, RISK MANAGEMENT TECHNOLO-
GY IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: RISK CONTROL, STRESS TESTING, MODELS, AND IT 
SYSTEMS AND STRUCTURES 145 (2007). 
 32. See DOUGLAS W. HUBBARD, THE FAILURE OF RISK MANAGEMENT: WHY 
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tion models generate probabilistic assessments of system fail-
ures even before any particular failure has occurred as an op-
erational matter. Recalling Petroski’s maxim that engineers 
learn from failure,33
B. SYSTEMS RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
 Monte Carlo methods permit engineers to 
simulate failures with computers and learn from them before 
they ever happen. 
While stress analysis has its roots in mechanical and struc-
tural engineering, its utility became apparent to other engi-
neers as well. In the second half of the twentieth century, engi-
neers developed a new branch of their discipline known as 
“systems reliability analysis” (SRA). SRA is inspired by the 
concept of reliability, which is tied to the concept of failure that 
undergirds all stress analysis. When used in this context, relia-
bility is a statistical concept describing the probability that a 
system will not experience failure during a specified time peri-
od under given operating conditions.34 The SRA engineer’s job 
is to identify potential sources of failure and design the system 
to avoid those failures.35 SRA engineers utilize visual diagrams 
and logic models known as fault trees and event trees to assist 
them in modeling the ways in which system failures can occur, 
particularly when engineering complicated systems such as nu-
clear power plants, transportation infrastructure systems, mis-
sile defense systems, resource extraction projects, space travel 
expeditions, and robotics.36 SRA can be seen as a precursor to 
stress testing in the financial regulatory context because it con-
templates human judgment as a source of system failure.37
 
IT’S BROKEN AND HOW TO FIX IT 60–63 (2007). 
 In 
this respect it is more readily adopted as a prototype for regu-
 33. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 34. See DEP’T OF DEF., HANDBOOK ON RELIABILITY GROWTH MANAGE-
MENT 2 (2011); BALBIR S. DHILLON, RELIABILITY ENGINEERING IN SYSTEMS 
DESIGN AND OPERATION 5 (1983); ERNST G. FRANKEL, SYSTEMS RELIABILITY 
AND RISK ANALYSIS 11–12 (1988); PATRICK D.T. O’CONNOR, RELIABILITY EN-
GINEERING 1 (1988). 
 35. MARVIN RAUSAND & ARNLJOT HØYLAND, SYSTEM RELIABILITY THEO-
RY: MODELS, STATISTICAL METHODS, AND APPLICATIONS 73 (2004).  
 36. See RAUSAND & HØYLAND, supra note 35, at 96–124; Clifton A. Eric-
son II, Fault Tree Analysis—A History, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH INT’L 
SYS. SAFETY CONF. 1 (1999), available at http://www.fault-tree.net/papers/ 
ericson-fta-history.pdf (“The fundamental concept of Fault Tree Analysis is the 
translation of the failure behavior of a physical system into a visual diagram 
and logic model.”). 
 37. See RAUSAND & HØYLAND, supra note 35, at 69. 
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lating corporate entities. 
Though materials stress testing and SRA methods trace 
their origins to the engineering discipline, the concept is by no 
means limited to that context; after all, perhaps the most wide-
ly recognized stress testing application comes from cardiology, 
where a stress test consists of induced cardiovascular stress 
through exercise or pharmacological agents followed by imag-
ing. The stress test’s purpose is to progressively overload the 
cardiovascular system in order to reveal abnormalities not pre-
sent at rest.38 It is a “focal point in the diagnosis and prognosis 
of cardiovascular disease.”39
II.  HOW DO STRESS TESTS WORK IN FINANCE?   
 And cardiology is just one salient 
example. The relevant scope of stress testing as a technique is 
as wide as the range of structures, materials, or systems that 
impact any matter of societal import—from the cardiovascular 
health of a single individual to citywide transportation systems 
and power plants. And stress analysis also applies, as ex-
plained below, to the financial system and the institutions that 
transact in it. 
A. WHY STRESS IS A PROMISING REGULATORY TOOL 
The paramount concern of financial regulators is financial 
failure—i.e., the insolvency of an institution or the inability of a 
financial market to perform reliably and consistently.40 Regula-
tors are charged with curbing failure on both institutional and 
systemic levels.41
 
 38. ROBERT S. ELIOT, STRESS AND THE HEART: MECHANISMS, MEASURE-
MENTS, MANAGEMENT 105 (1988). 
 Their supervisory duties consist primarily of 
minimizing institutional failures in order to limit recourse to 
government guarantees (e.g., deposit insurance, state insur-
ance guaranty funds) that are only partially recouped through 
ex post assessments on other institutions. Their system-wide 
regulatory duties consist primarily of preventing the break-
 39. David Akinpelu, Treadmill Stress Testing, MEDSCAPE, http:// 
emedicine.medscape.com/article/1827089-overview (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).  
 40. See Jean Pierre Sabourin, The Deposit Insurer’s Role in Maintaining 
Financial Stability, in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: RESOLVING LARGE BANK 
INSOLVENCIES 59, 59 (Douglas D. Evanoff & George G. Kaufman eds., 2005) 
(“Dealing effectively with systemic financial crises and the resolution of large 
bank insolvencies has always been an important subject for those working in 
the financial system safety net. But, it is becoming even more critical in a 
world of ever greater consolidation and globalization in financial services.”). 
 41. Id. at 61.  
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down in key financial functions such as the payments system, 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism, and savings 
transformation. A separate, but related danger against which 
regulators guard is the possibility that institutional or market 
failures ramify throughout the interconnected financial system, 
causing further failures with attendant system instabilities and 
losses to government guarantees.  
Outside of an actually experienced failure, stress testing 
practices comprise the settings where corporate managers and 
boards engage most directly with the concept of failure. On ac-
count of that preoccupation with failure, it is hardly surprising 
that regulators have adopted stress tests and stress analysis as 
regulatory tools. If anything, it is surprising that it took them 
so long. Nuclear engineers conduct stress tests and other SRA-
type exercises in order to ensure (1) the reliable delivery of 
electricity, on which businesses, households, and transporta-
tion systems depend; and (2) the avoidance of accidents, on 
which the environment depends.42
B. STRESS TESTS ARE A KEY COMPONENT OF EXISTING RISK 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
 Financial institutions play 
analogous roles and present similar risks in the economic con-
text. Their critical roles in facilitating payment systems, sav-
ings intermediation, and monetary policy transmission com-
prise the grid through which finance flows and commerce is 
enabled. And the consequences of a financial crisis can devas-
tate the wider economy, much like the catastrophic effects of a 
nuclear reactor incident on the surrounding environment.  
Over the past three decades, stress testing techniques have 
become an integral part of the risk management infrastructure 
of a typical financial firm. In the late 1980s and 1990s, most fi-
nancial firms developed systems of risk management to re-
spond to increased exposures to market, credit, and operational 
risks on account of the proliferation of derivatives during the 
same period.43
 
 42. Cf. Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http:// 
www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Safety-of 
-Nuclear-Power-Reactors/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2014) (discussing the imple-
mentation of stress tests to prevent accidents, as well as the importance of re-
liability). 
 From a corporate governance perspective, this 
revolution in risk management reflected the board of director’s 
 43. See Robert F. Weber, An Alternative Story of the Law and Regulation 
of Risk Management, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1005, 1020 (2013).  
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responsibility to set corporate risk policy and management’s 
delegated responsibility to put that policy into action.44 Though 
the initial impetus to develop risk management systems origi-
nated in the private sector, public bank regulators quickly per-
ceived that their ability to achieve their statutory mandates of 
institution-level safety and soundness and system-wide finan-
cial stability increasingly came to depend on the effectiveness 
of those systems. Accordingly, one of the key themes of bank 
supervision from the late 1980s to today is the redirection of 
supervisory resources towards fostering robust risk manage-
ment systems within banks.45 The use of stress testing as a 
regulatory technique forms part of this effort.46
1. Brief Introduction to Risk Management Systems 
 
At its most fundamental level, risk management is about 
identifying bad outcomes that could occur in an uncertain fu-
ture and taking deliberate action to shift the odds in a firm’s 
favor.47 Risk management thus comprises risk assessment and 
risk control.48
 
 44. Id. at 1044.  
 The risk assessment process requires considera-
 45. See Lessons Learned in Risk Management Oversight at Federal Finan-
cial Regulators: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and 
Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th 
Cong. 9 (2009) (statement of Timothy W. Long, Senior Deputy Comptroller, 
Bank Supervision Policy and Chief National Bank Examiner, Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency), [hereinafter Long Statement], available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg52966/pdf/CHRG-111shrg52966 
.pdf (“Risk management is a key focus of our large bank supervision pro-
gram.”); DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 274 (2008) (noting that because the “risks as-
sociated with the complexity and pace of large bank activities cannot be 
effectively contained even with sophisticated rules . . . the emphasis increas-
ingly has been on fostering robust risk management systems within the banks 
themselves”); Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Govs. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Remarks at the Stonier Graduate School of Banking, Washington, D.C. (June 
12, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
bernanke20060612a.htm (characterizing regulators’ “assessment of the quality 
of a bank’s procedures for evaluating, monitoring, and managing risk” as the 
“heart of the modern bank examination”). 
 46. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND 
STRESS TESTING PRACTICES AND SUPERVISION 5 (2009) [hereinafter BCBS, 
STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs155 
.pdf. 
 47. See DAN BORGE, THE BOOK OF RISK 4 (2001). 
 48. Cf. PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW BENCHMARK FOR 
MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK 3 (2d ed. 2001) (“Risk management is the process 
by which various risk exposures are identified, measured, and controlled.”). 
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tion of a firm’s objectives.49 The risk assessment process re-
quires consideration of a firm’s objectives.50 A risk to be con-
trolled, and therefore “managed,” is one that impacts the 
achievement of those objectives. One risk manager explains 
that the “Holy Grail of risk management” is “to find the best 
possible decision to make when faced with uncertainty.”51
This conception of risk presents a subtle contrast with oth-
er definitions of risk that use risk as a measure of volatility 
alone.
  
52 While the volatility of asset returns and interest rates 
is obviously relevant to a financial institution, I argue that risk 
management, properly conceived, should not equate risk with 
volatility alone. The idea that risk connotes volatility dates 
from 1921, when economist Frank Knight distinguished uncer-
tainty from risk on the grounds that latter was measurable and 
the former was not.53
First, it is too broad because it includes all uncertain fu-
ture events that are capable of probabilistic measurement. Risk 
management, however, is only concerned with uncertainty to 
the extent it might impact organizational objectives.
 This Knightian definition of risk has an 
impressive legacy, but it is inadequate to describe risk man-
agement for two reasons.  
54
 
 49. See David Garland, The Rise of Risk, in RISK AND MORALITY 48, 50–51 
(Richard V. Ericson & Aaron Doyle eds., 2003); Ian Hacking, Risk and Dirt, in 
RISK AND MORALITY, supra at 21, 22. 
 It would 
be absurd to talk about the meanderings of an ant as risky un-
til someone wagered a bet on the next movement. Second, it is 
in another respect too narrow because risk management is con-
cerned with unmeasurable uncertainty as well. In finance it is 
a commonplace to use risk to refer to the variance of returns 
from the expected return—a definition that is measured quan-
 50. See Garland, supra note 49, at 50–51; Hacking, supra note 49, at 22. 
 51. BORGE, supra note 47, at 12.  
 52. Risk and uncertainty are contested terms even within the risk man-
agement field. HUBBARD, supra note 32, at 79 (“Concepts about risk and even 
the word risk are a source of considerable confusion even among those who 
specialize in the topic.”). 
 53. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 233 (1921) 
(“To preserve the distinction between the measurable uncertainty and an un-
measurable one we may use the term ‘risk’ to designate the former and the 
term ‘uncertainty’ for the latter.”). 
 54. See HUBBARD, supra note 32, at 81–84; Glyn A. Holton, Defining Risk, 
60(6) FIN. ANALYSTS J. 19, 21 (2004) (“According to common usage, risk entails 
both uncertainty and exposure—possible consequences. Knight’s distinction 
addresses only the uncertainty.”). 
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titatively.55 In her revealing research performed while embed-
ded in bank risk management departments, Anette Mikes 
found evidence of two prevailing “calculative culture” types 
within risk management departments: quantitative enthusi-
asm and quantitative skepticism.56 Mikes found that while all 
the risk management departments she examined made exten-
sive use of quantitative information and statistical techniques, 
the quantitative skeptics considered risk measurements only as 
trend indicators to be taken into consideration alongside other 
qualitative criteria such as “managerial discretion, experience 
and judgment.”57 Quantitative skeptics regard quantitative risk 
measurement tools as “learning machines.”58
2. Brief Introduction to Value-at-Risk, a Building Block of 
Risk Management Systems 
 And yet a 
Knightian definition of risk would fail to include such infor-
mation.  
The idea of value-at-risk (VaR) connects the general con-
cept of risk management to the concrete practices of stress test-
ing at financial institutions. VaR models can be thought of as 
the basic building blocks of risk measurement and they also 
comprise the operational settings within which most financial 
stress tests are conducted.59 VaR is an expression of the amount 
of possible loss to which a financial firm is exposed.60
 
 55. See Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Fail-
ures at Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 59–60 (2010). 
 One risk 
management commentator refers to VaR as the “holy grail of 
 56. Anette Mikes, Risk Management and Calculative Cultures, 20(1) 
MGM’T ACCOUNTING RES. 18, 22 (2009). 
 57. Anette Mikes, Chief Risk Officers at Crunch Time: Compliance Cham-
pions or Business Partners, 2 J. RISK MGM’T FIN. INSTITUTIONS 7, 15 (2008). 
 58. Mikes, supra note 56, at 27.  
 59. COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
STRESS TESTING AT MAJOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: SURVEY RESULTS AND 
PRACTICE 3 (2005) [hereinafter BIS, STRESS TESTING PAPER]. But see Robert 
F. Weber, The Corporate Governance Case for Deliberation-Oriented Stress 
Testing Regulation, 39 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2014) (describing “expected 
shortfall” risk measurement techniques as an alternative to VaR). 
 60. A comprehensive definition of VaR would disaggregate the term into 
the most direct meaning expressed above in the text and also the VaR “proce-
dures” by which the VaR amount is generated, the statistical VaR “methods” 
utilized in the VaR procedures employed by the firm, and the VaR “approach” 
to risk management with its concomitant enthusiasm for risk quantification. 
See KEVIN DOWD, BEYOND VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW SCIENCE OF RISK MAN-
AGEMENT 21 (1998). 
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risk management.”61 From the inception of VaR methods, risk 
managers self-consciously designed VaR methods in a manner 
to facilitate a new deliberative discourse among corporate 
stakeholder on how risk permeates across a financial firm: 
“Subject to the simplifying assumptions used in its calculation, 
[VaR] aggregates all of the risks in a portfolio into a single 
number suitable for used in the boardroom, reporting to regula-
tors, or disclosure in an annual report.”62 Some risk manage-
ment commentators saw in VaR the potential for an aspira-
tional overhaul of corporate governance to a new rationalized, 
quantitative approach to managing not only risk but the entire 
firm.63
Risk managers express VaR as the maximum expected loss 
a firm will face within a specified probability level (known as 
the “confidence level”) over a particular time period (known as 
the “time horizon”).
 
64 The VaR model allows risk managers to 
make the following statement: “We are X percent certain that 
we will not lose more than V dollars in the next N days.”65 The 
most common variant of VaR methodology by far is historical 
simulation,66
In the computational phase, the firm takes its current as-
sets and liabilities and revalues them on the basis of daily his-
torical values for relevant risk factors (e.g., interest rates, ex-
change rates) and prices over a predetermined look-back 
period, most typically 500 days.
 which consists of a computational phase and an 
interpretive-planning phase.  
67
 
 61. LINDA ALLEN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING MARKET, CREDIT, AND OPERA-
TIONAL RISK: THE VALUE AT RISK APPROACH 3 (2004) (“[M]arket forces during 
the late 1990s created conditions that led to the evolution of VaR as a domi-
nant risk measurement tool for financial firms.”); JORION, supra note 
 This is essentially a counter-
48, at 
xxi; cf. note 51 and accompanying text. 
 62. Thomas J. Linsmeier & Neil D. Pearson, Value at Risk, 56 FIN. ANAL. 
J. 47, 48 (2000). 
 63. See DOWD, supra note 60, at 20–22. 
 64. CROUHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 187; DOWD, supra note 60, at 39.  
 65. JOHN C. HULL, RISK MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 196 
(2007). 
 66. See Christophe Pérignon & Daniel R. Smith, The Level and Quality of 
Value-at-Risk Disclosure by Commercial Banks, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 362, 
367–70 (2010) (finding that 73% of large international banks that disclose 
their VaR methodologies, a group that itself comprises 65% of all such banks, 
use historical simulation methods). 
 67. See JAMES GLEASON, RISK 187 (2000) (“In a nutshell, you run your 
daily [profit and loss] process over and over again, using the history of past 
daily market price moves.”). For assets traded on markets, risk managers can 
simply plug in the appropriate historical prices. For untraded assets, risk 
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factual exercise: “assuming we had this portfolio yesterday, and 
the day before yesterday, and so forth, what would our net prof-
it-loss position have been?”68 When the firm has valued its as-
sets and liabilities over the relevant time horizons comprising 
the look-back period, it ranks the net profit-loss outcomes from 
worst to best.69
In the interpretive-planning phase, risk managers decide 
on the applicable confidence level. If the confidence level is, say, 
five percent, they will look to the fifth percentile of outcomes—
thus, if the look-back period is 500 days then the fifth percen-
tile would be the twenty-fifth worst net profit-loss outcome.
  
70 
The difference between current market values of the portfolio 
and this fifth percentile is then interpreted as the “value” that 
is “at risk” over the next day.71
As thus described, the term “value-at-risk” is a misnomer. 
Of course, the “value” that is “at risk,” as a layperson under-
stands the term, is always the entire portfolio.
 A higher confidence level will 
result in a higher VaR number—e.g., if the confidence level is 
99% instead of 95% then the value at risk will be the difference 
between current market values and the fifth worst net profit-
loss outcome. 
72 In fact, VaR 
really tells you what you should expect to lose a few times a 
year.73
[VaR] is not the answer to the simple question: How much can I lose 
on my portfolio over a given period of time? The answer to this ques-
tion is “everything,” or almost the entire value of the portfolio! . . . In-
stead, [VaR] offers a probability statement about the potential change 
 One risk management text summarizes this point: 
 
managers must construct a pricing model that specifies how the identified risk 
factors affect the asset’s value. 
 68. JORION, supra note 48, at 221 (observing that historical VaR methods 
do not “represent an actual portfolio but rather reconstruct[] the history of a 
hypothetical portfolio using the current position”). If the time horizon is longer 
—say, 10 days—then risk managers make appropriate adjustments. Specifi-
cally, they typically assume that the VaR estimate for a time horizon consist-
ing of N days is equal to the product of the 1-day VaR estimate times √N. See 
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 7 (referring to this method as the “square root 
rule”); HULL, supra note 65, at 203. 
 69. See Miller, supra note 55, at 63. 
 70. See DOWD, supra note 60, at 39. 
 71. See id.  
 72. See id. at 40 (noting that such a measure “is not very informative”). 
 73. See Jón Daníelsson, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Limits to Risk 
Modeling, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 1273, 1275 (2002) (noting that VaR “is only 
concerned with the 99% loss level, or a loss which happens 2.5 times a year, 
implying that VaR violations have very little relevance to the probability of 
bankruptcy, financial crashes, or systemic failures”). 
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in the value of a portfolio resulting from a change in market factors, 
over a specified period of time. [VaR] is the answer to the following 
question: What is the maximum loss over a given period such that 
there is a low probability, say a 1 percent probability, that the actual 
loss over the given period will be larger?74
VaR techniques are a linchpin of all risk management sys-
tems, whether the departments operating those systems are 
staffed with quantitative enthusiasts or quantitative skeptics.  
 
Even putting aside the inherent arbitrariness with select-
ing a time horizon and confidence level, there are technical lim-
itations of the VaR techniques themselves. These limitations 
are well-documented and, at the risk of venturing into well-
trodden territory—particularly after the recent financial crisis 
—three brief points regarding VaR’s limitations are helpful in 
order to better understand the utility of stress testing. These 
limitations also emerge in a new light when considered along-
side the related debate within engineering concerning the rela-
tive advantages of direct experimentation and analytical mod-
eling.75
The first limitation is epistemic. The embedded assumption 
of all VaR techniques is that the uncertain future will resemble 
the past.
 
76 The point may be stated even more narrowly: the fu-
ture will resemble a non-random sample of recent past condi-
tions.77 This point should not be over-emphasized; it is of course 
true that the past is a useful guide for predicting the future. 
But although VaR models almost always achieve their purpose 
in normal market conditions, they do not work well when it 
comes to the extreme, rare market movements that are most 
closely associated with failure.78
 
 74. CROUHY ET AL., supra note 
  
6, at 187. Lore attributes the invention of 
the idea of VaR to risk managers within J.P. Morgan in the early 1990s. See 
GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. 
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATAS-
TROPHE 33–34 (2009). The term appeared for the first time in a publicly avail-
able source in an influential report on derivatives published by the Group of 
Thirty in 1993. See JORION, supra note 48, at 22. 
 75. See supra notes 28–37 and accompanying text. 
 76. See HULL, supra note 65, at 221 (“Additionally, we should bear in 
mind that historical simulation assumes that the joint distribution of daily 
changes in market variables is stationary through time. This is unlikely to be 
exactly true and creates additional uncertainty about the value of VaR.”). 
 77. See Miller, supra note 55, at 64–65. In some respects, weighting recent 
time series data improves the accuracy of VaR estimates due to the stickiness, 
or cyclicality, of volatility levels. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 36. 
 78. CROUHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 162; PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT 
RISK: THE NEW BENCHMARK FOR MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK 357 (3d ed. 
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The second limitation is statistical. Even if we were con-
vinced that the future would resemble the past, the look-back 
periods are typically too small to permit the reliable statistical 
inferences.79 Adopting a longer look-back period increases the 
robustness of the data set but with fast-changing markets older 
data might reflect obsolete market conditions and therefore 
contribute little to the accuracy of the distribution.80
Third, financial markets and institutions interact in com-
plex ways. Even assuming that the values for relevant risk fac-
tors are normally distributed, in real financial markets a single 
anomaly can ramify quickly through a financial network, inter-
acting with other risk factors in unpredictable ways and poten-
tially increasing exposures dramatically.
  
81 The models, by con-
trast, assume that financial markets resemble the weather and 
place the risk manager in the role of meteorologist. Like the 
molecules and energy that interact to produce weather phe-
nomena, the millions of heterogeneous financial market partic-
ipants ensure that their aggregate actions are susceptible to 
randomized model. While this assumption no doubt holds dur-
ing most periods, it breaks down in crises in large part because 
stressed human actors are less predictable than stressed mole-
cules.82
Instead, the risk factors interact in ways that defy the ex-
ante assumptions of the model. Risk is therefore said to be en-
dogenous, which leads to unpredictable embedded properties 
non susceptible to ex ante modeling. This might simply be an-
other problem of statistical data insufficiency—risk managers 
just don’t yet know how these interactions should be distribut-
ed as a statistical matter.
  
83 However, some question whether 
such complex phenomena as financial market crises are ever 
capable of being the subject of predictive modeling.84
If the problem is simply one of data insufficiency, there is a 
partial solution: risk managers can build analytical models that 
generate profit-loss data based on assumptions about how rele-
vant parameters (e.g., interest rates, stock prices) interact to 
  
 
2007). 
 79. Miller, supra note 55, at 65.  
 80. See JORION, supra note 48, at 222.  
 81. See Daníelsson, supra note 73, at 1276. 
 82. See id. at 1276–77. 
 83. See HUBBARD, supra note 32, at 185–87. 
 84. See Weber, supra note 10, at 691–97 (summarizing several experi-
ments showing dramatic phase transitions in dynamically modeled financial 
markets even with simple computer-based agents). 
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produce historical returns.85 The predominant analytical model-
ing method is the Monte Carlo method familiar from the earlier 
discussion of stress testing in engineering.86 When risk manag-
ers use Monte Carlo methods, they generate repeated simula-
tions of risk factors, each time re-valuing the portfolio accord-
ing to the generated “scenario.”87 They can then run thousands 
(or more) simulations to obtain a wider data set from which to 
draw conclusions about VaR values. The virtue of Monte Carlo 
is that it is not limited by the historical biases that hamper his-
torical simulation. Instead of relying on the historical distribu-
tion of risk factors, risk managers have to design the stochastic 
process by which the factor values are generated.88 This ad-
vantage also creates a model risk problem: risk managers need 
to model the distribution of risk factors (and also the correla-
tions between them) in a manner that is untethered to observed 
historical facts.89 Fortunately, risk managers can work around 
this problem by conducting multiple simulation runs with dif-
ferent sets of risk factor distribution models.90 One of the major 
benefits of Monte Carlo simulation is that it offers the oppor-
tunity to engage in critical deliberation, including on failure 
possibilities, as risk managers construct risk factor models.91
C. A TAXONOMY OF FINANCIAL STRESS TESTING TECHNIQUES 
 
The purpose of VaR, as noted above, is to communicate in-
formation concerning a firm’s vulnerability as it anticipates the 
 
 85. See HULL, supra note 65, at 233 (“The main alternative to the histori-
cal simulation approach for estimating VaR for market risk is what is known 
as the model-building approach . . . .”); JORION, supra note 48, at 224–29. As 
recently as 2000 banks made heavy use of analytical models in what are 
known as the variance-covariance approach and the delta normal approach, 
though today such approaches have fallen into disuse. Pérignon & Smith, su-
pra note 66, at 367 n.15. For a technical summary of these techniques, both of 
which require stylized statistical assumptions concerning the normal distribu-
tion of risk factor volatility, see DOWD, supra note 60, at 63–98; HULL, supra 
note 65, at 233–52. 
 86. See Pérignon & Smith, supra note 66, at 372 fig. 4 (finding that 21% of 
those large international banks that disclose their VaR methodologies, a group 
that itself comprises 65% of all such banks, use Monte Carlo methods); supra 
notes 31–33 and accompanying text.  
 87. CROUHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 212–16; cf. CHORAFAS, supra note 31, 
at 147 (noting that Monte Carlo “uses random sampling to determine some 
probabilistic property of a population of objects or events”). 
 88. JORION, supra note 48, at 224–26.  
 89. See id. 
 90. See CROUHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 216. 
 91. See CHORAFAS, supra note 31, at 155. 
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conditions within which it will operate in an uncertain future.92 
The two dominant methods of VaR systems—historical simula-
tion and Monte Carlo—accomplish that task by relying, respec-
tively, on recent historical returns and assumptions concerning 
the behavior of, and relationships between, risk factors.93 These 
assumptions make VaR easy to use and communicate within 
the firm.94 Accordingly, they enhance a firm’s understanding of 
its vulnerabilities. But VaR still tells us very little about the 
underlying causes of failure and the channels through which it 
may emerge.95
Stress testing alerts management to adverse unexpected 
outcomes related to a variety of contingent circumstances and 
often provides an indication of the magnitude of the potential 
loss or funding gap.
 Their limitations ensure that VaR is only a part 
of a robust system of risk management.  
96 The advantage of stress testing is its in-
creased flexibility, when compared to VaR, to identify vulnera-
bilities to extreme events.97
For historical and conceptual reasons, it is helpful to con-
sider stress testing against the background of VaR techniques. 
Risk managers developed stress testing methodologies along-
side VaR systems.
 Stress tests are therefore the most 
direct connection between financial firm management and fail-
ure.  
98 And several of the exercises that carry the 
“stress test” label are operationalized within VaR statistical 
models. As one risk management expert noted, “stress-testing 
means choosing scenarios that are costly and rare, and then 
putting them to a valuation model.”99
 
 92. See supra notes 
 While he overstates the 
case somewhat—for instance, war games are increasingly seen 
as a part of stress testing but are not susceptible to quantita-
tive modeling—the links between stress testing and quantita-
tive modeling techniques are historical and operational. This is 
64–65 and accompanying text.  
 93. See CROUHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 206–16.  
 94. See supra notes 62–63 and related text.  
 95. Cf. CHORAFAS, supra note 31, at 155 (“To depend on facts without put-
ting them under stress is most dangerous because facts alone say nothing 
about underlying causes.”). 
 96. See BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 7. 
 97. CROUHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 239–40. 
 98. See Drehmann, supra note 4, at 62 (“Notwithstanding that objectives 
are different for different stress tests current models share very much a com-
mon structure. . . . [T]his structure is rooted in the quantitative risk manage-
ment framework.”). 
 99. Jeremy Berkowitz, A Coherent Framework for Stress Testing, 2 J. RISK 
1, 2 (2000). 
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not to say that the uses of stress tests are cabined within VaR 
practices. When used properly, stress tests are “a complement, 
rather than a supplement,” to these statistical measures.100
The discussion below develops a typology of the contexts 
within which stress testing has become an important compo-
nent of risk management. Disparate methods of stress testing 
can be distinguished. An overarching distinction may be ob-
served between sensitivity analysis and scenario analysis. Sce-
nario analysis can take the form of portfolio-driven scenario 
analysis and event-driven scenario analysis. Event-driven sce-
nario analysis may be further decomposed into historical sce-
nario analysis and hypothetical scenario analysis.
  
101
 
 War games 
and regulator-conducted stress tests are addressed separately. 
The below schematic depicts these basic distinctions, which are 
further developed in this section: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 100. BIS, STRESS TESTING PAPER, supra note 59, at 3. 
 101. See BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 5. 
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1. Firm-Conducted Stress Tests 
Firm-conducted stress tests can be divided into sensitivity 
analyses, scenario analyses, and direct “war game” scenarios. 
Brief descriptions of each category of exercise follow. 
a. Sensitivity Analysis 
When conducting sensitivity analysis, risk managers move 
isolated risk factors by a unit amount to determine how “sensi-
tive” metrics such as profit and loss are to the changes.102 For 
example, the firm might consider the impact of a 100 basis 
point shift in bond yields, or a 10% decline in the stock market. 
Sometimes these tests are performed on single, isolated varia-
bles, and other times risk managers consider correlations be-
tween the stressed variable and other risk factors to determine 
how the firm would respond to a more comprehensive suite of 
changes in risk factors.103
When conducting sensitivity analysis within the VaR con-
text, risk managers posit values for one or more risk factors 
outside the scope of the VaR model.
  
104 For example, risk man-
agers using historical simulation VaR might re-value the firm’s 
portfolio based on changes in interest rates that are outside the 
confidence interval or even outside the historical distribution 
entirely. The limitation of sensitivity analysis is that the stipu-
lated changes in risk factor variables are unlikely to resemble a 
future real-life scenario.105 Such tests nevertheless are very use-
ful for verification purposes, allowing the firm “to form a first 
approximation of the impact on the firm of a move in a finan-
cial variable.”106
b. Portfolio-Driven Scenario Analysis  
 
Scenario analysis takes the further step of considering how 
specific real-world scenarios might cause those risk factor vari-
ables to shift.107 When conducting portfolio-driven scenario 
analysis, risk managers examine an existing portfolio, discuss 
and individuate its vulnerabilities, and then imagine scenarios 
under which those vulnerabilities would become stressed.108
 
 102. See BIS, STRESS TESTING PAPER, supra note 
 
59, at 8. 
 103. See id. 
 104. Id. at 4. 
 105. SHIRREFF, supra note 6, at 66–67. 
 106. BIS, STRESS TESTING PAPER, supra note 59, at 8. 
 107. Id. at 6. 
 108. Id.  
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The intellectual exercise is similar to the fault tree analysis 
that reliability engineers perform.109 Some commentators refer 
to these obviously imaginative, highly counter-factual portfolio-
driven tests as “reverse stress tests.”110
c. Event-Driven Scenario Analysis 
 In effect, the risk man-
agers attempt to reverse engineer a failure.  
By contrast, an event-driven stress test starts from an im-
agined scenario involving stressed risk factor variables in order 
to see how the firm or the portfolio might respond.111 The sce-
nario fixes the risk factor variables and subjects them to a risk 
model—usually the firm’s VaR model—with respect to a given 
set of exposures or portfolios, in the process generating a meas-
ure of the risk exposure to which that scenario corresponds.112
 
 
It is therefore similar to sensitivity analysis, though it fre-
quently considers multiple risk factor variables and is con-
ceived of as a potentially real scenario, whether historical or 
hypothetical. The schematic below illustrates this process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When conducting historical scenario analysis, risk manag-
ers attempt to reproduce the effects of extreme historical 
events.113 A hypothetical scenario is a significant market event 
that has no direct historical precedent. Obviously, the latter in-
volves significantly greater exercise of managerial discretion 
and judgment in formulating the scenario.114
 
 109. See supra note 
 Risk managers 
frequently invite senior managers, front desk sales staff, and 
36 and accompanying text. 
 110. BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 14. 
 111. BIS, STRESS TESTING PAPER, supra note 59, at 6. 
 112. See id. at 7. 
 113. See id. at 10 (highlighting the October 1987 stock market crash, the 
1998 Russian debt default, the 2000 collapse of Long-Term Capital Manage-
ment, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and the 2001 U.S. terrorist attacks as 
frequently used scenarios); SHIRREFF, supra note 6, at 66. 
 114. See Berkowitz, supra note 99, at 2–3 (“The problem is that choosing 
stress-test scenarios is by its very nature subjective.”). 
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economists to these discussions.115 At the enterprise level, this 
broader participation also goes some way to ensuring that 
cross-business correlations and interactions are taken into ac-
count.116 One commentator has disaggregated event-driven sce-
narios into four types of simulated shocks: (1) scenarios that 
are expected “to occur more frequently than historical observa-
tions suggest”; (2) scenarios that have never occurred, but 
which might occur; (3) scenarios reflecting “the possibility that 
statistical patterns could break down in some circumstances”; 
and (4) scenarios reflecting “structural breaks” that could occur 
in the future.117 Hypothetical scenarios are particularly helpful 
to test the robustness of assumptions underlying statistical 
models for financial assets with limited historical data concern-
ing risk.118 If properly conducted, event-driven scenario analysis 
can be used as a learning tool that “raises as many questions as 
it answers.”119
But for all their evident promise, event-driven stress tests 
have not been implemented effectively. In a 2005 study, the 
Bank for International Settlements found that some firms have 
difficulty selecting “big picture” hypothetical scenarios.
 
120 A 
2009 Government Accountability Office report on risk man-
agement failures singled out banks’ failure to create a scenario 
for the hardly remote possibility of a severe downturn in the 
economy.121
d. War Games 
  
War games lie on the outward bound of the stress testing 
definitional category, in large part because they do not fit neat-
ly with analytical modeling tools such as VaR. I use the term 
here to connote direct simulations of scenarios where firm per-
sonnel “act out” how they would react to the appearance of 
 
 115. BIS, STRESS TESTING PAPER, supra note 59, at 7. 
 116. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-499T, FINANCIAL REG-
ULATION: REVIEW OF REGULATORS’ OVERSIGHT OF RISK MANAGEMENT SYS-
TEMS AT A LIMITED NUMBER OF LARGE, COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: 
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON SECS., INS., & INVS. OF THE S. COMM. 
ON BANKING, HOUS., & URBAN AFFAIRS, 111TH CONG. 22–24 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter GAO Risk Management Oversight Assessment], available at http://www.gao 
.gov/products/GAO-09-499T. 
 117. Drehmann, supra note 4, at 73–74. 
 118. BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 9. 
 119. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 5. 
 120. BIS, STRESS TESTING PAPER, supra note 59, at 8. 
 121. GAO Risk Management Oversight Assessment, supra note 116, at 22. 
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stressed market variables. Despite their ill fit with quantitative 
models, war games contribute to managerial understanding of 
uncertainty and how failure might develop.122 The authors of a 
book on political risk laud war games scenarios as being moti-
vated “to inspire creative problem solving and to spur manag-
ers to think about unthinkable outcomes.”123
Unsurprisingly, the roots of war games can be traced in 
military history.
 The same could be 
said with respect to financial risk. 
124 Military planners run “hard gaming” simu-
lations conducted with computer models alone, “soft gaming” 
simulations involving indoor simulations, and “field training 
exercises” involving a large number of personnel across even 
thousands of square miles.125 As early as the 1970s, corporate 
firms began to conduct their own direct simulations of adverse 
events. Royal Dutch-Shell was an early pioneer of these tech-
niques, even taking its executives through the possibility of a 
sharp rise in oil prices a year before the 1973 Arab oil embar-
go.126 Even today, Royal Dutch-Shell is applauded for its politi-
cal war gaming scenario analysis in connection with invest-
ment projects.127 The Deloitte consultancy developed a War 
Game-style simulation that it labeled a “stress test” to gauge 
the adequacy of measures developed by businesses and those 
responsible for IT and transportation infrastructure decisions 
in advance of the 2012 summer Olympic Games in London.128
 
 122. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, STANDARDS FOR RAPID RESOLU-
TION PLANS 10 (2011), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/ 
wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Economic_Mobility/Standards_Rapid_Resolution_ 
Plans.pdf. 
 In 
finance, some commentators have called for regular use of war 
 123. IAN BREMMER & PRESTON KEAT, THE FAT TAIL: THE POWER OF POLIT-
ICAL KNOWLEDGE FOR STRATEGIC INVESTING 26 (2009). 
 124. B. Sheppard & D. Slavin, The Use of War Game Simulations for Busi-
ness Strategies, in REAL-TIME AND DELIBERATIVE DECISION MAKING 77, 77 
(Igor Linkov et al. eds., 2008).  
 125. Id. at 79–80; see also SHIRREFF, supra note 6, at 108 (“The British 
armed forces play war games once a year. Two sides code-named ‘Red’ and 
‘Blue’ slug it out in virtual warfare. For them the purpose is to test equipment, 
communications and soldiers without the expense and losses associated with a 
real war.”). 
 126. BREMMER & KEAT, supra note 123, at 26–27; SHIRREFF, supra note 6, 
at 106–07. 
 127. See BREMMER & KEAT, supra note 123, at 26–27. 
 128. Keith Weir, “Stress Test” Highlights Olympic Transport Fears, 
REUTERS (June 18, 2012), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/06/17/uk-olympics 
-business-stress-idUKBRE85G0SB20120617. 
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gaming in developing resolution plans—also known as “living 
wills” or “funeral plans.”129
The unique advantage of war game simulations is their 
ability to “simulat[e] human imponderables and behaviors” as 
they might unfold as failure approaches.
 
130 To harness these 
unique advantages of war games, testers apply aspects of direct 
experimental stress testing techniques from mechanical and 
structural engineering to the human organizational realm.131 
But in order for the war games to produce useful failure-related 
information, the human decision makers involved in the war 
game must remain open to the possibility of failure.132 Other-
wise, the war game becomes less a learning exercise and more 
of a validation of prior commitments and strategies. In his ac-
count of the Midway Battle with U.S. Naval forces over the Pa-
cific, Japanese General Mitsuo Fuchida—who led Japan in the 
successful Pearl Harbor raid—recounts how Rear Admiral 
Matome Ugaki overruled decisions by the umpires of Japanese 
central command war games.133 Consequently, the results of the 
game suggested that the Japanese naval conquest of the Pacific 
would proceed much more smoothly than expected.134 Military 
assets were allocated in part based on the outcomes of the war 
games with disastrous consequences for the Japanese forces, 
which had underestimated the riskiness of its strategy.135
The conceptual transition from stress testing of physical 
systems such as suspension bridges to social systems such as 
financial markets is marked by the presence of strategic human 
actors. Because people think and plan strategically, and then 
make decisions based on their plans, they are much more diffi-
cult to model than physical system components.
 
136
 
 129. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 
 A social sys-
tem’s stability depends not only on the risks to which it is sub-
122, at 1 n.1.  
 130. Sheppard & Slavin, supra note 124, at 80. 
 131. For a discussion of direct experimental stress testing techniques in the 
engineering discipline, see supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 132. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 122, at 6 (“Systemically 
significant activities should be identified and provisions made to maintain 
them through a failure.”). 
 133. MITSUO FUCHIDA & MASATAKE OKUMITA, MIDWAY: THE BATTLE THAT 
DOOMED JAPAN, THE JAPANESE NAVY’S STORY 124–26 (Clarke H. Kawakami 
& Roger Pineau eds., 1955). 
 134. Id. at 96. 
 135. Id. at 96–98. 
 136. See W. Brian Arthur, Complexity and the Economy, 284 SCIENCE 107, 
107 (1999); J. Doyne Farmer et al., Is Economics the Next Physical Science?, 58 
PHYSICS TODAY 37, 39 (2005). 
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ject at any given point, but also on our perceptions of those 
risks.137 While it is true that “the odds [of] a 100-year storm do 
not change because people think that such a storm has become 
more likely,”138 the odds of a liquidity run are very much affect-
ed by subjective human perceptions of its likelihood. This pre-
sents the endogeneity of risk problem discussed earlier.139
2. Regulator-Conducted Stress Tests 
 War 
gaming allows risk managers to become more familiar with 
these odds, or at least with the causal network out of which 
such an event may spring. Once a sufficient number of games 
have been conducted, it may be possible to use the data in sta-
tistical models to apply to other contexts. 
Regulator-conducted stress tests are performed by the fi-
nancial regulator, not the regulated financial firms. This cate-
gory of stress tests includes isolated, one-off stress tests as well 
as more regular, structured programs of stress testing.140 The 
subjects of regular, structured programs of stress tests can be 
individual institutions or entire financial systems.141 The Fi-
nancial Stability Assessment Program (FSAP), established by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in response to the 
Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, is the most prominent 
example of a regular stress testing program of entire financial 
systems. Under the FSAP, IMF personnel conduct an in-depth 
analysis of an individual country’s financial system.142 Each 
FSAP concludes with the preparation of a Financial System 
Stability Assessment (FSSA), which focuses on issues relevant 
to IMF surveillance.143
 
 137. JOHN KAMBHU ET AL., NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR 
UNDERSTANDING SYSTEMIC RISK 65 (2007). 
 One of the main components of the 
 138. Id. at 48. 
 139. See supra Part II.B. 
 140. See Marco Sorge, Stress-Testing Financial Systems: An Overview of 
Current Methodologies 1 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 165, 
2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work165.pdf (labeling these tests 
the “piecewise approach” and “integrated approach,” respectively). 
 141. Id. at 6. 
 142. FSAP assessments take place on a voluntary basis. As of 2009, over 
three-fourths of IMF member countries have undertaken an FSAP assess-
ment. Public Information Notice No. 04/33, Int’l Monetary Fund, IMF Execu-
tive Board Reviews Experience with the Financial Sector Assessment Program, 
Options for the Future, and Complementary Reforms in Surveillance and the 
Assessment of Standards and Codes (Sept. 29, 2009), available at http:// 
www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2009/pn09123.htm.  
 143. Id.  
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FSSA is a system-wide stress test to assess financial stabil-
ity.144
Stress tests often are designed with the cooperation of the national 
authorities with a goal to quantify the systemwide exposures that 
may result from a significant change in financial market fundamen-
tals. The scenarios are usually specified as partial equilibrium “what 
if” type exercises where estimates of the balance sheet consequences 
of a financial event are quantified using data from a number of insti-
tutions or with aggregate data.
 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) economist 
Paul Kupiec describes the FSAP stress tests as follows: 
145
Kupiec judges the stress tests to be of little informational value 
due to regulators’ lack of access to information on banks’ off-
balance sheet and derivative positions.
 
146 He also laments the 
partial equilibrium assumptions of the stress tests—that is, 
their focus on a single factor in isolation without considering 
how stress in that factor might interact dynamically with other 
risk factors.147
In recent years, policymakers have focused increasingly on 
regulator-conducted stress tests. U.S. bank regulators conduct-
ed a one-off, ad hoc round of stress tests for the nineteen larg-
est bank holding companies in 2009 as a linchpin of their ef-
forts to stabilize the reeling banking industry.
  
148 Since then, 
European banking authorities have conducted several rounds 
of ad hoc stress tests of banks subject to their supervision.149 
Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2010 made regular, periodic stress test-
ing of banks a new responsibility for bank regulators.150
The below table lays depicts the rough taxonomy of stress 
tests presently in use at financial institutions. It highlights the 
extent of managerial involvement in the design and conduct of 
tests. It also registers the extent to which the tests rely on VaR, 
which, as discussed above, yields precise, quantifiable numeri-
cal outputs. Notice that managerial involvement in stress test-
ing is highest where VaR usage does not predominate. The 
 These 
matters are taken up in greater detail below in Part IV.C. 
 
 144. See Paul Kupiec, The IMF-World Bank Financial Sector Assessment 
Program: A View from the Inside, in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: RESOLVING 
LARGE BANK INSOLVENCIES 69, 71 (Douglas D. Evanoff & George G. Kaufman 
eds., 2005). 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. at 77.  
 147. Id.  
 148. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.  
 149. See infra notes 284–87 and accompanying text.  
 150. See infra note 265 and accompanying text.  
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trade-off between open-ended managerial involvement and the 
precision of largely automated analytical tools has significant 
implications for design of a regulatory system of stress testing. 
This point is taken up in the next Part.  
 
Types of Stress Tests Management  
Involvement 
Usage 
of VaR 
Conducted 
by  
Regulator 
Regular, 
Periodic  
System-wide None Some 
Institution-specific 
Ad hoc, 
“One-off” 
System-wide None Some 
Institution-specific 
Conducted 
by Firm 
Sensitivity Single Isolated  
Variable 
Low Predomi
nant 
Multiple Variable Low Predomi
nant 
Scenario Portfolio-Driven/ 
“Reverse Stress 
Tests” 
High No 
Event-
Driven 
Historical Low Some 
Hypothet-
ical 
High Some 
“War Games” High No 
III.  ELABORATING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
DELIBERATION-ORIENTED STRESS TESTING AND 
ASSURANCE-ORIENTED STRESS TESTING   
Note that in all their manifestations highlighted above, 
stress tests share a common element: they provide information 
to decision makers concerning economic outcomes in an uncer-
tain future. The category of “decision makers” includes, most 
prominently, risk managers, but also could include business 
managers, directors, regulators, investors, and even financial 
service consumers. This suggests a general point on risk man-
agement that has been underemphasized in both the technical 
and academic finance and law literature: namely, that VaR is 
only one of several modes by which information production oc-
curs in financial firms. The role of risk managers is to adopt 
and administer analytical tools that generate information and 
then communicate it throughout the firm, at times competing 
for executive and board attention or triggering automated pro-
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cesses—e.g., to sell off or hedge risk exposures.151 True to their 
roots in the engineering discipline, stress tests in finance are 
usually the predominant context in which ex ante information 
concerning failure and stress that is not captured in the VaR 
framework is produced. Therefore, the mix of tools that a par-
ticular firm or regulator adopts determines the decisional in-
frastructure within which a firm’s managers and directors pro-
cess and act on failure- and stress-related information. Each 
system of stress testing implies a determination as to how 
much institutional resources, imagination, and attention 
should be devoted to imagining “dark visions” as plausible sce-
narios that ultimately might color firm or regulator decision-
making.152
Of course, some uses of stress tests contribute more mean-
ingfully than others to an understanding of the likely channels 
through which failure might emerge. The diversity of contexts 
in which stress tests can be put to use highlights the need for 
policymakers and scholars to make appropriate distinctions 
among types of stress tests.
 
153
 
 151. Cf. CROUHY, supra note 
 This Article argues in favor of an 
overarching distinction between two broad stress testing ap-
proaches: assurance-oriented stress testing and deliberation-
oriented stress testing. These terms describe the firm’s institu-
tional orientation to stress testing—i.e., its attitudinal settings 
and decisional infrastructure—but they are also helpful to 
characterize regulatory interventions according to the sort of 
institutional orientation regulators are seeking to promote. 
That is, a regulated bank may implement a stress testing pro-
gram that draws heavily from an assurance-oriented stress 
testing approach, but the bank’s regulators may intervene by 
promoting deliberation-oriented stress testing during bank ex-
aminations or through rulemaking. Thus, assurance-oriented 
stress testing and deliberation-oriented stress testing refer to 
the dispositions of the actors conducting and deliberating on 
6, at xvii.  
 152. See Saul Hansell & Joseph B. Treaster, The Job of Imagining the Un-
imaginable, and Bracing for It, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2001, at C1 (explaining 
how the September 11 attacks affected Wall Street risk management strate-
gies). 
 153. See Drehmann, supra note 4, at 62 (“It is not enough to call for more 
stress testing but it is also important to know what should ultimately be 
achieved with the stress test results.”). 
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the tests and the use to which they are put; the distinction does 
not categorize the particular types of tests themselves.154
Stress testing as a regulatory tool is in its infancy, so the 
binary is admittedly rough, but certain generalizations can be 
observed from these two orientations. Each represents an en-
counter with the concept of failure, but from different perspec-
tives. Assurance-oriented stress testing privileges static scenar-
ios, draws from audit culture, relies on historical precedents, 
examines tested variables in isolation, requires precise estima-
tion, and is motivated by compliance and verification con-
cerns.
  
155 By contrast, deliberation-oriented stress testing privi-
leges dynamic scenarios, draws from business operations 
culture, relies on imagination, considers the interactivity of 
tested variables, remains open to open-ended and uncertain 
outcomes, and is motivated by governance concerns.156
A. ASSURANCE-ORIENTED STRESS TESTING  
  
As with other audit-like exercises, assurance-oriented 
stress testing frequently involves communicative events for 
which the relevant audience carries expectations as to the for-
mat and precision of the communicated information.157 Thus a 
program of regulator-conducted stress tests of banks with an-
nounced results to assuage market concerns about the banks’ 
bad loans or securities would be an example of assurance-
oriented stress testing. The test would be designed to com-
municate information to bank investors and counterparties, 
and even the broader economy, concerning the banks’ suscepti-
bility to failure. So too would a bank’s internal sensitivity anal-
ysis158
 
 154. See supra Part II.C for a discussion of the various types of financial 
stress tests. 
 program designed to verify that the assumed distribution 
of risk factor variables in its VaR model did not miss sharp 
non-linear increases in expected losses immediately outside the 
distribution. Here, the audience is the risk management team 
itself and the exercise can be conceived of as a spot audit check 
of the VaR model’s robustness. These expectations require a 
degree of precision in terms of the stress tests’ final outputs. 
Greater precision facilitates communication to the audience, 
but it requires greater rigidity in the design of the stress test so 
 155. Weber, supra note 59, at 2 n.3.  
 156. Id.  
 157. On the importance of audience, see Drehmann, supra note 4, passim. 
 158. See supra notes 102–06 and accompanying text. 
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as to produce quantifiable metrics. This orientation towards 
stress testing, while undoubtedly of great importance, receives 
the most attention from industry and commentators, but the 
familiarity of these uses of stress tests disguises their technical 
and institutional limitations.  
Because it requires greater precision, assurance-oriented 
stress testing does not readily accommodate qualitative busi-
ness judgments or take into account the dynamism of financial 
markets.159
  Market crises unfold over a period of time, during which [market] 
liquidity may dry out. Yet most scenario analyses are static in nature, 
i.e., are one-period models and do not allow for the trading of posi-
tions in an environment where liquidity varies from one period to the 
next . . . . [Such analyses] assume that events occur simultaneously, 
and that the portfolio [being tested] remains constant during the pe-
riod. The modeling framework usually does not allow for dynamic 
hedging or the unwinding of positions.  
 Michel Crouhy makes this point with respect to the 
dynamic supply and demand of liquidity at financial institu-
tions: 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [T]raditional VaR models are, by construction, static. Increasing 
the risk horizon from one day to ten days, one month, or one year, 
does not make the model more dynamic. . . .  
. . . . 
Clearly, liquidity risk cannot be factored into this traditional static 
framework.160
Crouhy is making a point about the endogeneity, or reflexive, 
nature of risk in financial markets.
 
161 Assurance-oriented stress 
testing typically models an exogenous, or outside, shock to the 
test subject. The second-order (and third-order, and so forth) 
effects on the firm—to say nothing of those of counterparties 
and others transacting in the relevant market—are not mod-
eled. This omission fails to take account of the financial system 
as it actually exists as a network of counterparties that interact 
and respond to one another.162
 
 159. See BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 
 It echoes Kupiec’s concerns 
46, at 2–3.  
 160. CROUHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 241. 
 161. See Drehmann, supra note 4, at 77–79; see also supra Part II.B.2’s dis-
cussion of the technical limitations of statistical models.  
 162. See Prassana Gai & Sujit Kapadia, Contagion in Financial Networks, 
466 PROCS. ROYAL SOC’Y A 2401 passim (2010); Erlend Nier et al., Network 
Models and Financial Stability, 31 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 2033 pas-
sim (2007). 
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about the partial equilibrium assumptions embedded in the 
IMF’s FSAP stress tests.163
The intellectual context of a stress test used as an assur-
ance-verification tool takes the business decisions to allocate 
capital to a particular portfolio or business line as its starting 
point. The exercise of imagination by risk managers is not en-
couraged. The question posed—i.e., “What would be the loss if 
things got this bad?”—admits a single answer. Of course, this is 
also its virtue. Assurance-oriented stress testing only becomes 
a problem when it becomes the predominant feature of a firm’s 
stress testing program rather than an ancillary feature of a 
broader, more deliberative program. Even a superficial compar-
ison between (1) a spot-check sensitivity analysis addressing a 
change in prevailing interest rates and (2) a “reverse stress 
test”
  
164 exercise inquiring into how a portfolio might fail due to 
interest rate fluctuations illustrates the point. The former will 
yield a useable data point or a “pass-fail” or “yes-no” determi-
nation, whereas the latter would yield instead a set of further 
questions.165 And it is easy to see how the precision of the result 
can lead to such stress tests being implemented to facilitate 
simple, binary audit-like tasks.166
I do not mean to overstate these critiques of assurance-
oriented stress testing. It contributes to risk managers’ under-
standing of portfolio risk and its ease of use ensures frequent 
recourse to it. It is certainly more open-ended and flexible than 
closed VaR model systems. However, assurance-oriented stress 
testing on its own will not promote more ambitious regulatory 
objectives of financial stability and institution-level safety and 
soundness.
  
167
 
 163. See supra note 
 As such, attempts by policymakers, regulated fi-
nancial institutions, or trade associations to cast assurance-
oriented stress testing initiatives as something more than help-
ful verification tools should be evaluated skeptically. Such 
claims might reveal more about our anxiety concerning failure 
and stress more than the ability of assurance-oriented stress 
147 and accompanying text. 
 164. On reverse stress tests, see supra Part II.C.1.b. 
 165. See Nassim N. Taleb et al., A New Heuristic Measure of Fragility and 
Tail Risks: Application to Stress Testing 9–11 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper No. WP/12/216, 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ 
ft/wp/2012/wp12216.pdf (“[S]tress test results are often presented as having a 
binary ‘pass/fail’ outcome.”). 
 166. See Wessel, supra note 2, at A2 (discussing implications flowing from 
the fact that “the word ‘test’ . . . implies pass or fail”). 
 167. See supra Part III.A. 
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testing to contribute meaningfully to our ability to understand 
them. Michael Power has argued that a similar phenomenon 
exists with respect to risk management more generally: that 
the modern emphasis on risk management reflects our aspira-
tions to control increasingly uncontrollable phenomena.168
B. DELIBERATION-ORIENTED STRESS TESTING 
 
These limitations of assurance-oriented stress testing 
emerge even more clearly when it is compared with delibera-
tion-oriented stress testing. In contrast to assurance-oriented 
stress testing, deliberation-oriented stress testing privileges 
dynamic scenarios, draws from business operations culture, re-
lies on imagination, considers the interactivity of tested varia-
bles, remains open to uncertainty, and is motivated by govern-
ance concerns. In this manifestation, stress testing emerges 
less as a mechanical tool for regulators and risk managers and 
more as an aspirational internal corporate governance norm 
that is preoccupied with stress, failure, and instability. Delib-
eration-oriented stress testing aspires to inform risk managers 
and other executives, as well as the board, of risks across the 
entire enterprise in addition to portfolio-specific risks. Fur-
thermore, unlike assurance-oriented stress testing, it has no 
built-in audience; it is engaged in open-ended deliberation for 
 
 168. See MICHAEL POWER, ORGANIZED UNCERTAINTY: DESIGNING A WORLD 
OF RISK MANAGEMENT 5 (2007) (“[T]he phenomenon of ‘risk’ management of 
more and more aspects of social and organizational life reflects an increase in 
social expectations about the decidability and management of dangers and op-
portunities.”); see also LEE CLARKE, MISSION IMPROBABLE: USING FANTASY 
DOCUMENTS TO TAME DISASTER 4 (1999) (“[U]nder conditions of high uncer-
tainty the promise and apparatus of rational planning itself becomes mainly 
rhetorical, becomes a means by which plans—independently of their functional 
relevance to the task—can be justified as reasonable promises that exigencies 
can be controlled. When uncertainty about key aspects of a task is high, ra-
tionalistic plans . . . become rationality badges, labels proclaiming that organi-
zations and experts can control things that are, most likely, outside the range 
of their expertise. . . . Thus do organizations try to control the uncontrolla-
ble.”); Daníelsson, supra note 73, at 1274 (“There is . . . an increasing body of 
evidence that inherent limitations in risk modelling technology, coupled with 
imperfect regulatory design, acts more like a placebo rather than a 
scientifically proven preventer of crashes it is sometimes made out to be.”); 
Weber, supra note 43, at 1009 (presenting theory that risk management might 
be “a placeholder delimiting the range of objects that demand organizational 
control rather than the range of objects that are in fact susceptible to such con-
trol”).  
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the sake of better understanding and communicating failure 
vulnerabilities.169
Andrew Haldane, Executive Director for Financial Stabil-
ity at the Bank of England, has advanced what he calls a “five-
point plan” to guide the supervision of stress testing practices 
at banks.
 
170 His proposals touch on several deliberation-
oriented stress testing themes. First, he recommends both ac-
tive involvement of regulators in crafting stress scenarios and 
the use of “reverse stress tests” by firm risk managers—what 
he refers to as “test[ing] . . . the destruction of their balance 
sheets.”171 Second, as a starting point, regulators should ar-
range for banks to conduct common stress scenarios to facilitate 
benchmarking of the results and the banks’ VaR models.172 
Third, stress tests should be dynamic, so that the second and 
subsequent round interactions, and their consequences for sys-
tem-wide risk, can be evaluated.173 He describes such an ap-
proach as “iterative” stress testing and highlights the useful-
ness of such an approach to uncover phenomena relating to 
asset sales and liquidity hoarding that cannot be taken into ac-
count by assurance-oriented stress testing exercises.174 Haldane 
describes such an exercise as a “stress test cum war game.”175 
Fourth, regulators must engage in a follow-up dialogue with 
bank management concerning the results of the stress tests.176 
Haldane’s fifth point is addressed to what regulators should do 
with the information gleaned from stress tests rather than how 
the tests should be conducted.177
 
 169. See Drehmann, supra note 
 Taleb et al. similarly pick up 
on deliberation themes when they propose exploring the fragili-
4, at 61 (observing that when used for pur-
poses of communicating risk throughout a firm, stress tests should be “trans-
parent and suitable for storytelling”). 
 170. Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Bank of Eng., Why Banks Failed the 
Stress Test, Remarks at the Marcus-Evans Conference on Stress-Testing 8–9 
(Feb. 9–10, 2009) [hereinafter Why Banks Failed the Stress Test], available at 
http://www.bis.org/review/r090219d.pdf. 
 171. Id. at 8. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 8–9.  
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. at 9. 
 176. Id.  
 177. Specifically, he argues that regulators should (1) take the results of 
the tests and information gleaned during post-test discussion into account 
when setting firms’ capital and liquidity buffers and (2) require public disclo-
sure of results to enhance market discipline. Id. at 9.  
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ty of stress tests themselves—by asking “[h]ow would our esti-
mates respond to a marginal change of the stress scenario?”178
Even some industry representatives have come to advocate 
for a greater emphasis of deliberation-oriented stress testing, in 
spite of its greater costs.
 
179 The Counterparty Risk Manage-
ment Policy Group III (CRMPG), the membership of which is 
comprised almost entirely of representatives of the largest in-
ternationally active banks,180 published a series of recommen-
dations on how to limit systemic risk in 2008.181 The CRMPG 
recommended several practices that resonate with deliberation-
oriented stress testing, including: (1) disclosure to counterpar-
ties of stress test results on term sheets for difficult-to-
understand financial instruments, which should facilitate 
learning;182 (2) reverse stress tests to address issues not cap-
tured by VaR models;183 (3) incorporation of an “expanded suite 
of stress tests into a formalized production schedule, against 
which trends and developments in key risk factors and expo-
sure amounts can be tracked“;184 and (4) liquidity stress tests to 
gauge how unsecured and secured funding sources could dry up 
during times of stress.185 The report also makes specific recom-
mendations concerning the scenarios firms should run. Of par-
ticular note is consideration of: reputational and franchise-
related risks, off-balance sheet exposures, and, as noted above, 
liquidity implications of stress (even on an intraday basis) at 
the consolidated- and entity-level.186
The great promise of deliberation-oriented stress testing is 
that it will foster a more mindful decisional infrastructure 
within financial institutions that institutionalizes the continu-
ous deliberation on failure, catastrophe, and stress. By thus in-
tervening into the corporate governance infrastructure of fi-
 This is a far cry from 
standard VaR-dominated risk management. 
 
 178. Taleb et al., supra note 165, at 6. 
 179. On the relative costliness of deliberation-oriented stress testing, see 
infra notes 447–56 and accompanying text. 
 180. See COUNTERPARTY RISK MGMT. POLICY GRP. III, CONTAINING SYS-
TEMIC RISK: THE ROAD TO REFORM, at vii–x (2008) [hereinafter COUNTERPAR-
TY RM GROUP REPORT], available at http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/docs/ 
CRMPG-III.pdf. 
 181. Id. at 18–19. 
 182. Id. at A-1 to A-2. 
 183. Id. at 84–85.  
 184. Id. at 85.  
 185. Id. at 27–28. 
 186. Id. at 28–30. 
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nancial institutions, stress testing mandates might curb man-
agers’ and boards’ historic tendency to adopt excessively ac-
commodating attitudes towards risk. In the process, it might 
facilitate regulatory efforts to promote the increasingly inde-
terminate and shifting statutory objective of financial stability 
—in other words, resilience to failure—under conditions of un-
certainty, volatility, and authentic complexity.187
C. FOUR HYPOTHETICAL CASE STUDIES OF STRESS TESTING 
  
The four hypothetical case studies developed below illus-
trate both the wide breadth of techniques that go by the stress 
testing label and the contrast between assurance-oriented 
stress testing and deliberation-oriented stress testing. In the 
first and second case studies, two banks design and conduct 
stress tests to assess the likely impact of adverse developments 
in the leveraged loan business. The third and fourth case stud-
ies introduce the effects of regulatory influence on stress test-
ing, each describing an initiative by state insurance regulators 
to use stress testing concepts in their supervision of life insur-
ance companies. 
1. “Bank of Hazard” 
Consider two fictional firms—we’ll call them Bank of Haz-
ard (Hazard) and Bank of Prudence (Prudence)—each of which 
conducts a hypothetical event-driven stress test of its leveraged 
loan portfolio. Hazard submits its portfolio to a hypothetical 
scenario involving a rapid 250-basis point (bp)188 jump in 
spreads on a leveraged loan index,189
 
 187. See generally Weber, supra note 
 a scenario well outside the 
scope of the Hazard’s VaR model. The risk managers selected 
10 (arguing that in many respects 
contemporary financial systems are characterized by complexity rather than 
mere complicatedness and discussing the implications). 
 188. One bp is one-hundredth of a percent. JOHN DOWNES & JORDON 
ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 56 (7th 
ed. 2006). Thus, a 400-bp increase in spreads is a 4.00% increase. A dramatic 
increase in leveraged loan spreads would signal the market’s heightened per-
ception of the riskiness of the loans and, ceteris paribus, would necessarily en-
tail a corresponding price reduction in the market value of the loans. 
 189. The “spread” of a fixed income asset is the incremental amount of the 
asset’s yield that is greater than a benchmark rate, such as LIBOR (the Lon-
don Interbank Offered Rate). For example, if LIBOR is 2.5% and a leveraged 
loan yield is 7.0%, then its spread is 4.5%. A 250 bp increase in the spread 
would result in 7.75% yield. In this context, the “yield” expresses the ratio of 
contractual interest payments over the current market price of the loan. See 
id. at 803. 
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250 bp because it represented the “nightmare scenario” of the 
highest single-day jump in the index spread since its inception 
fifteen years ago. Hazard risk managers conduct the test by re-
valuing each of the leveraged loans in the portfolio in light of 
the hypothetical spread increase and compute the aggregate 
value of the portfolio ($450 million), which is $100 million lower 
than its current market value ($550 million). Next, they com-
pare the $100 million difference to the VaR figure based on a 
95% confidence level, which is $70 million—i.e., the VaR model 
suggests that Hazard should be 95% certain that it will not lose 
more than $70 million over the applicable time horizon. The 
$100 million loss is 133% of the VaR figure of $75 million.  
Because Hazard has a firm-wide risk limit policy that pro-
hibits it from incurring any exposure for which a stress test re-
veals a potential loss of 150% of the VaR figure, the risk man-
agers do not take any corrective action, but they send a memo 
to the leveraged loan department and the corporate treasury 
department notifying them that an abrupt 250-bp increase in 
spreads would very nearly bump up to the risk exposure limits 
set by top management. Some of the bankers take note, per-
haps even pausing to consider which categories of leverage 
loans might be most susceptible to such a spread increase and 
whether similar profits—whether from interest on the loans or 
transaction fees—could be obtained without incurring that risk. 
Others silently whisper to themselves “There’s no way spreads 
are going to jump that high anytime soon; besides, my comp is 
based on deal volume and management told us to do more 
deals.” 
2. “Bank of Prudence” 
Risk managers at Bank of Prudence conduct a similar sce-
nario test involving a 400 bp increase in the index spread. 
While the basic idea for the scenario originated during ex-
changes between bankers and risk managers within the lever-
aged loan department, the risk managers discussed the scenar-
io with risk managers from the corporate treasury department. 
The corporate treasury risk managers point out that in such a 
scenario two other problems might occur: providers of Pru-
dence’s short-term credit, such as repo lenders, will become 
concerned about (1) Prudence’s creditworthiness and (2) the 
value of the leveraged loans that Prudence has pledged as col-
lateral for any secured short-term lending.  
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As such, they suggest the scenario should also test for the 
effects on Prudence’s liquidity position of a simultaneous 25% 
increase in collateral demands from short-term funding 
sources. Another risk manager points out that such a dramatic 
increase in spreads and collateral demands might very well be 
accompanied by a failure of one of Prudence’s larger counter-
parties that has been known to trade in the riskiest leveraged 
loans and rely heavily on overnight repo lending to fund its op-
erations. The risk managers decide to run the base scenario 
with the 400 bp spread increase and the 25% increase in collat-
eral demands and an alternative scenario that assumes that a 
large counterparty defaults on all its unsecured obligations to 
Prudence.  
3. Isolated Stress Test of GMDB Exposures 
Consider next two hypothetical regulatory examples of 
stress testing. In the first example, a state insurance regulator 
conducts an isolated, one-off sensitivity analysis of the guaran-
teed minimum death benefit (GMDB) variable annuity con-
tracts for all the life insurance companies subject to its jurisdic-
tion.190 All of the tested companies had regulatory capital levels 
in excess of the “company action level” that would require regu-
latory intervention.191
 
 190. GMDB contracts are a type of variable annuity contract. Whereas 
with a normal variable annuity the annuitant’s contributions are invested in 
assets for which the annuitant and his or her beneficiaries bear the entire 
amount of market risk, with a GMDB contract, the insurance company guar-
antees a minimum payout in the event of the annuitant’s death irrespective of 
the balance of the variable annuity account, thereby shifting a portion of the 
market risk from the annuitant’s beneficiaries to the insurance company.  
 Nevertheless, recent press coverage of 
the unfavorable experience of GMDB business in several com-
panies domiciled in other jurisdictions has led to concerns 
about annuitants liquidating their GMDB contracts. The at-
tenuated investor confidence concerns the state insurance regu-
lator because large policy liquidations deplete an insurance 
company of assets to a point at which its claims-paying ability 
is impaired. This concern motivates the regulator to conduct 
the stress test, which assumes a stock market decline of 20% 
 191. See Robert F. Weber, Combating the Teleological Drift of Life Insur-
ance Solvency Regulation: The Case for a Meta-Risk Management Approach to 
Principles-Based Reserving, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 35, 61 n.103 (2011) (de-
scribing the risk-based capital regime and the role of “company action level” 
capital triggers). 
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over the course of three months.192 The regulator announces 
that it will require the holding company of any insurance com-
pany that “fails” the stress test to contribute additional capital 
to the company.193
4. Ongoing Program of Dialogic Stress Testing of GMDB 
Exposures 
 The regulator explains that a company will 
fail the stress test if its regulatory capital would be less than 
200% of the “company action level” under the scenario. Of the 
ten insurance companies subjected to the stress test, nine pass 
and one fails. The failing company’s holding company is in-
structed to contribute an additional $40 million of additional 
capital. The regulator issues a press release announcing the re-
sults of the stress test, which is reported in the industry press 
and sent via email to every registered insurance agent in the 
state. 
In the second example, the insurance regulator of another 
state with several large life insurance companies, similarly 
concerned by the volume of GMDB business underwritten by 
its domiciliary companies, establishes a stress testing program. 
The regulator publishes a circular instructing all insurance 
companies subject to its supervision to stress test their GMDB 
contract portfolios regularly for “equity market and related 
risks.” The circular provides for direct involvement of regulato-
ry examiners in testing design and implementation, and regu-
latory review of results.  
Several companies quickly contact their examiners and 
lament the lack of precision in the circular, asking what specific 
steps should be taken. The other companies begin planning for 
the stress test. Some companies’ risk managers actively solicit 
input from affiliated investment banks and investment advi-
sors concerning the equity markets. Two companies discuss 
with the product design colleagues what the impact of a dra-
matic equity decline would be on the behavior of existing annu-
itants, focusing in particular on whether they would increasing-
ly liquidate their policies. Four companies involve senior 
management in several of the stress test planning meetings. 
 
 192. A decline in the stock market would result in a decrease in the 
amounts of the variable annuity accounts. If the account values were to fall 
below the guaranteed amounts under the GMDB contracts, the insurance 
company would be obligated to make up the difference. See supra note 190 and 
accompanying text. 
 193. Weber, supra note 191, at 61. 
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Others simply submit the stress test plan to senior manage-
ment for final approval, and one firm fails to consult senior 
management at all.  
The companies discuss their initial stress test designs with 
examiners, and explain how their proprietary quantitative sta-
tistical models would implement the stress tests. The examin-
ers meet subsequently to de-brief each other on the initial 
meetings and identify attributes of the stress test, such as con-
sideration of the dynamic interaction of equity market declines 
and withdrawal of annuitants’ funds. They then meet again 
with the insurance companies and present several of the identi-
fied attributes as mandatory best practices for this and future 
stress tests. Pursuant to the circular, the insurance companies 
are ordered to review the results of the stress test with senior 
management and the board of directors. For those insurance 
companies identified by examiners as having designed unso-
phisticated stress tests or having failed to consult affiliated ex-
pertise or management input, examiners direct their risk man-
agement departments to change their stress testing practices in 
certain respects and notify them that the companies would be 
subject to spot examinations of stress testing practices with 
greater frequency.  
IV.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF 
FINANCIAL STRESS TESTING   
Having presented a normative case in favor of a regulatory 
regime that fosters deliberation-oriented stress testing, the Ar-
ticle now turns to a brief history of regulatory interventions in-
to stress testing. Have legislators and regulators been aware of 
the difference between deliberation-oriented stress testing and 
assurance-oriented stress testing? And to the extent that they 
have, have their policy initiatives been effective in promoting 
deliberation-oriented stress testing among regulated financial 
firms? The following chronology demonstrates that to date, as-
surance-oriented stress testing has predominated over deliber-
ation-oriented stress testing in guiding regulatory activity.  
A. TWO IMPROBABLE EARLY STRESS TESTING INITIATIVES 
Regulatory interventions into stress testing practices had 
improbable origins. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
(FHLBB), which was pilloried for poor performance and even-
tually disbanded in the aftermath of the savings-and-loan de-
bacle, issued a series of innovative bulletins and policy state-
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ments to supervised thrifts concerning their management of in-
terest rate risk and derivatives-related risks in the 1980s.194 
Dramatic spikes in interest rates in the early 1980s led to de-
posit flight from the thrifts, which were statutorily proscribed 
from offering competitive interest rates on deposits.195 Congress 
eventually liberalized thrift deposit rates and the FLHBB re-
moved the asset restrictions that formerly had prevented 
thrifts from underwriting non-traditional loan products.196 But 
the FHLBB quickly became concerned that thrifts were assum-
ing risks that compromised their safety and soundness as a re-
sult of their new investment powers, including by speculating 
in derivatives.197 This series of late-1980s FHLBB pronounce-
ments represents the first intervention by bank supervisory au-
thorities into risk management and stress testing regulation. 
Thrift Bulletin 12, published in 1988, is especially relevant in 
this context.198 In it, the agency required not only that thrift 
boards oversee management’s development of a “comprehensive 
business plan” detailing risk management objectives (including 
position limits), but also that thrifts perform “sensitivity analy-
sis” before investing in certain instruments.199
Four years later, another improbable innovator—the U.S. 
Congress—utilized the concept of stress in its Federal Housing 
Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 
(FHEFSSA).
  
200
 
 194. LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS 
FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION 128–31 (1991). 
 FHEFSSA established a new Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) within the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development as the prudential 
regulator in charge of monitoring the capital adequacy and 
safety and soundness of the two major government-sponsored 
housing entities (GSEs): Federal National Mortgage Associa-
 195. Id. at 67–72.  
 196. The liberalization of the asset restrictions would, the FHLBB hoped, 
allow thrifts to achieve the required rates of return with higher-yielding assets 
that they would need to retain fleeing, and attract new, deposits. Id. at 72–74. 
 197. See Investment Portfolio Policy and Accounting Guidelines, 54 Fed. 
Reg. 23,457, 23,461, 23,471 (May 19, 1989). 
 198. FED. HOME LOAN BANK BD., THRIFT BULL. NO. 12, MORTGAGE DERIV-
ATIVE PRODUCTS AND MORTGAGE SWAPS (1988) [hereinafter THRIFT BULLETIN 
NO. 12], available at http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/ots/bulletins/ 
rescinded-thrift-bulletins/ots-tb-12.pdf.  
 199. Id. at 2.  
 200. Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, ch. XIII, Pub. L. 
102-550, 106 Stat. 3672, 3941–4012 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 12 U.S.C). 
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tion (known as Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mort-
gage Corporation (known as Freddie Mac).201 The Act required 
OFHEO to conduct a simple, periodic scenario test to “meas-
ure[] risk in the context of a company’s overall portfolio, includ-
ing the company’s risk management activities.”202 Congress re-
ferred to the scenario as a “stress period.”203
Under the FHEFSSA stress testing regime, OFHEO would 
determine the amount of capital each GSE would need to sur-
vive a ten-year scenario characterized by large credit losses, 
large swings in interest rates, and other adverse conditions im-
pacting the assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet obligations 
of the GSEs.
  
204 The test would project cash flows from the 
GSEs’ assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet obligations and 
produce monthly balance sheets for the 120 months of the 
stress test period.205 A GSE would “pass” the stress test, and 
therefore avoid intrusive interventions by OFHEO, by ensuring 
a positive total capital position throughout the simulated ten-
year adverse period of adverse conditions.206
 
 201. Id. §§ 1311–1319G. 
  
 202. Organization and Functions, 68 Fed. Reg. 32,627, 32,627 (June 2, 
2003); see also Press Release, Office of Fed. Housing Enter. Oversight, OFHEO 
Issues Risk-Based Capital Stress Test Results for Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac 4 (June 27, 2002) [hereinafter OFHEO Stress Testing Press Release], 
available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2240/62702stresstestresults.pdf 
(“OFHEO is among the first financial institution regulators to use its own 
stress test to determine capital adequacy.”). 
 203. See OFHEO Stress Testing Press Release, supra note 202, at 14.  
 204. Risk-Based Capital, 66 Fed. Reg. 47,730, 47,730–31 (Sept. 13, 2001).  
 205. Risk-Based Capital, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,850, 11,850 (Mar. 15, 2002). 
 206. Technically, the GSEs would need to maintain 130% of the total capi-
tal required to provide for the extra capital buffer on account of “management 
and operations risk.” The stress test results were incorporated directly into the 
machinery of the capital adequacy rules. Under FHEFSSA, the GSEs would be 
required to maintain core capital of 2.5 percent of assets plus 0.45% of adjust-
ed off-balance sheet obligations and total capital in an amount at least equal 
to the risk-based capital level. Housing and Community Development Act 
§§ 1361, 1362, & 1364. As used in FHEFSSA, “core capital” consists of com-
mon and preferred stocks, paid-in capital, and retained earnings; and “total 
capital” consists of core capital plus a general (i.e., not applicable to specific 
provisioned-for losses) foreclosure loss allowance and “any other amounts from 
sources of funds available to absorb losses incurred by the [GSE]” that the 
OFHEO director “by regulation determines are appropriate to include in de-
termining total capital.” Id. § 1303(4), (18). The “risk-based capital level” (also 
referred to as “stress test capital” in OFHEO’s implementing rule) for a GSE 
was the amount of capital that would enable the GSE to survive the 10-year 
stress test plus 30 percent of that amount to provide for “management and op-
erations risk.” Id. § 1361(c); Risk-Based Capital, 66 Fed. Reg. 47,730, 47,731 
(Sept. 13, 2001).  
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It might seem surprising to learn of congressional innova-
tion with avant-garde financial regulatory techniques with re-
spect to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. After all, when the hous-
ing bubble burst in 2007 nearly three decades after the passage 
of FHEFSSA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were leveraged six-
ty-to-one and were placed into conservatorship where they 
racked up billion-dollar quarterly losses on the taxpayer’s 
dime.207 Closer examination reveals that although the GSE 
stress tests can be characterized as novel,208
Consider, for example, that: (1) OFHEO, not the GSEs, was 
responsible for conducting the tests, so no local knowledge was 
harnessed and GSE corporate governance was unaffected;
 their effectiveness 
was handicapped by familiar shortcomings of assurance-
oriented stress testing methods. 
209 (2) 
the test was applied with respect to the GSEs’ asset portfolios 
as they existed at a fixed point in time;210 (3) the variables that 
were stressed and, in many cases, the methodologies by which 
they were stressed, were also fixed, specified in FHEFSSA it-
self;211 (4) the stress scenarios were drawn from historical prec-
edents, meaning that the stress test assumed, at least with re-
spect to any single variable, that the worst was in the past;212
 
 207. See VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., GUARANTEED TO FAIL: FANNIE MAE, 
FREDDIE MAC, AND THE DEBACLE OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 23–27 (2011). 
 
 208. Technically, FHEFSSA was not the trailblazer in establishing regular, 
periodic stress testing of financial institutions as a component of supervision. 
In 1991, Congress had already instructed the Farm Credit Administration to 
establish an Office of Secondary Market Oversight (OSMO) and to direct the 
OSMO to develop and administer a similar test to the Federal Agricultural 
Mortgage Corporation (known as Farmer Mac). See Food, Agriculture, Conser-
vation, and Trade Act Amendments of 1991 § 503, Pub. L. No. 102-237, 105 
Stat. 1818, 1870–72 (1991) (inserting new section 8.32 in the Farm Credit Act 
of 1971). 
 209. OFHEO Stress Testing Press Release, supra note 202, at 4. 
 210. Id. at 5.  
 211. See, e.g., Risk-Based Capital, 66 Fed. Reg. 47,730, 47,732 (Sept. 13, 
2001) (noting, for example, that FHEFSSA prescribes credit losses and rises 
and falls in baseline interest rates to be used in the stress test). 
 212. OFHEO’s treatment of haircuts illustrates this historicity bias. When 
simulating the stress test’s effects on the GSEs’ balance sheets, FHEFSSA in-
structed OFHEO to give the GSEs credit for cash payments that would be re-
ceived during the stress period from counterparties to GSE contracts, such as 
mortgage insurance companies and derivatives counterparties. See Risk-Based 
Capital, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,850, 11,850 (Mar. 15, 2002). However, because the 
ability of counterparties to pay the GSEs contracted-for cash payments would 
be adversely affected by the simulated conditions of the stress test, OFHEO 
provided for percentage-based “haircuts,” or discounts, to the value of the cash 
payments. Id. OFHEO determined the rates of counterparty default and the 
severity levels of the defaults (i.e., the amount of loss a GSE would suffer from 
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(5) variables were isolated and they did not interact dynamical-
ly;213 and (6) the outcome of the test was a binary pass-fail veri-
fication that did not prompt further action.214 Moreover, by ty-
ing the stress test exercise directly to a capital adequacy 
regime that required compliance with precise rules, Congress 
entrenched an adversarial, top-down regulatory relationship. 
OFHEO’s responses to the GSEs’ comments, published in the 
Federal Register, reflect a consistently adversarial relationship 
in which the GSEs, perceiving that increases to capital re-
quirements would reduce their return on equity, advocated at 
nearly every juncture for the attenuation of the stressed condi-
tions used in the tests.215 “Stress” was a periodically negotiated 
event rather than a continuous subject of deliberation within 
the firm and between the firm and its regulators.216 During the-
se one-off negotiations, the regulator was deliberating on 
stressed conditions, and the regulated entity minimized threats 
in order to achieve lower capital requirements.217
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRESS TESTING REGULATION FROM 
1990-2006 
 
Throughout the 1990s and the first part of the 2000s, 
stress testing regulation was, with one notable exception, char-
acterized by either assurance-oriented stress testing or a 
vagueness that defies ready categorization along the delibera-
tion-assurance binary. These regulatory interventions occurred 
in two principal contexts: regulation pertaining to derivatives 
risk management and regulation pertaining to capital adequa-
cy.218
 
a default, taking into account, e.g., foreclosure sales of collateral) using data 
from the Great Depression. Id. at 11,851–52. 
 As with all of bank supervisory policy during this period, 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision—the interna-
tional bank regulatory policy coordinator—played an important 
 213. Id.  
 214. Risk-Based Capital, 66 Fed. Reg. 47,730, 47,732 (Sept. 13, 2001). The 
point is that the capital requirement is either met (i.e., the GSE has sufficient 
capital in light of the test) or it is not met (i.e., the GSE lacks sufficient capital 
in light of the test). If the latter, then the GSE must raise additional capital, 
but there is no follow-up discussion about, for example, what is causing the 
lack of adequate capitalization or how might those causes be mitigated. 
 215. Risk-Based Capital, 66 Fed. Reg. 47,730, 47,736 (Sept. 13, 2001).  
 216. See, e.g., id. at 47,742. 
 217. See id. at 47,741–42. 
 218. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDE-
LINES FOR DERIVATIVES ¶¶ III.2, 8, 14 (1994) [hereinafter BASEL RISK MAN-
AGEMENT GUIDELINES], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc211.pdf.  
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role.219
In 1993, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), which supervises federal chartered national banks, is-
sued Circular No. 277.
 With the exception of the so-called 1996 market risk 
amendments to the capital adequacy rules, regulators moved 
haltingly into this area of regulatory policy, stopping well short 
of articulating a regulatory vision of deliberation-oriented 
stress testing. Instead, notwithstanding the promising market 
risk amendment approach to stress testing, banks during this 
period used stress tests almost exclusively as an assurance tool, 
in the process missing key signals of the impending financial 
crisis. 
220 The circular was noteworthy because 
with it the OCC made the first attempt at a comprehensive set 
of risk management guidelines in connection with burgeoning 
derivatives activities by banks. The OCC directed bank man-
agement to, among other things, “facilitate stress testing” in 
order to “evaluate risk exposures under various scenarios that 
represent a broad range of potential market movements and 
corresponding price behaviors and that consider historical and 
recent market trends.”221 A year later, the Basel Committee 
published its own guidance on risk management for derivatives 
activities, mentioning quantitative and qualitative stress tests 
that “identif[y] possible events or changes in market behavior 
that could have unfavourable effects on the institution and [as-
sess] the ability of the institution to withstand them.”222 The 
Basel Committee reiterated this guidance the following year in 
a joint report it published with the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), instructing bank supervi-
sors to require “[i]nstitutions with significant trading books [to] 
subject their portfolios on a regular basis to stress tests using 
various assumptions and scenarios.”223
 
 219. Id. at Preface ¶ 1; BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, FRAME-
WORK FOR SUPERVISORY INFORMATION ABOUT THE DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES OF 
BANKS AND SECURITIES FIRMS 12 (1995) [hereinafter BASEL DERIVATIVES 
FRAMEWORK], available at https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs19.htm. 
 In 1996, the OCC pub-
lished special guidance concerning credit derivatives and again 
emphasized the importance of stress testing to “evaluate the 
 220. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANKING CIRCULAR 
NO. 277, RISK MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (1993). 
 221. Id. at 13. 
 222. BASEL RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 218, at ¶III.6. 
 223. BASEL DERIVATIVES FRAMEWORK , supra note 219, at 12. 
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bank’s exposure in a highly stressed market scenario.”224 The 
following year, in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian crises, the 
OCC issued supplemental guidance that specifically addressed 
examiner and board-level oversight of stress testing.225 In 1998, 
the Basel Committee and IOSCO updated their 1995 deriva-
tives supervision report by providing some examples of scenari-
os supervisors might require banks to run.226
The vagueness of these references to stress testing in the 
early derivatives risk management guidance contrasts some-
what with the later, more elaborate treatment of stress testing 
in the Basel Committee-led restructuring of capital adequacy 
regulation. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Basel 
Committee radically reworked capital adequacy regulation
 
227 by 
permitting banks to set their minimum regulatory capital lev-
els by reference to their proprietary statistical models such as 
VaR.228 The Basel Committee initially extended such treatment 
in 1996 to the market risk capital charge—i.e., the amount of 
capital held against losses on derivatives and other securities 
that the bank does not expect to hold to term.229 As a precondi-
tion to usage of this new VaR-based market risk capital ade-
quacy regime, banks’ risk management systems had to satisfy 
certain requirements, including having in place a “rigorous and 
comprehensive stress testing program.”230 The Basel Committee 
specifically mentioned historical and hypothetical scenario 
analysis and sensitivity analysis.231
 
 224. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULLETIN 
NUMBER 1996-43, GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL BANKS (1996), available at 
http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/1996/bulletin-1996-43.html. 
 Most interestingly, the 
 225. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, RISK MANAGEMENT 
OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (1997), available at http://www.occ.gov/pub 
lications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/deriv.pdf. 
 226. INT’L ORG. OF SECURITIES COMM’NS & BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SU-
PERVISION, FRAMEWORK FOR SUPERVISORY INFORMATION ABOUT DERIVATIVES 
AND TRADING ACTIVITIES 12 (1998), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
bcbs39.pdf. 
 227. Capital adequacy rules require banks to maintain minimum amounts 
of loss-absorbent capital, such as common equity, to serve as a cushion against 
unanticipated losses. See Robert F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regu-
lation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models Ap-
proach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 789 (2010). 
 228. See id. at 807–11. 
 229. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO THE 
CAPITAL ACCORD TO INCORPORATE MARKET RISKS 5–6 (2005), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs119.pdf. 
 230. Id. at 42–43. 
 231. Id.  
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Committee believed that “stress tests should be both of a quan-
titative and qualitative nature” and that they should address, 
in addition to first-order market losses, the “liquidity aspects of 
market disturbances.”232
Qualitative criteria should emphasize that two major goals of stress 
testing are to evaluate the capacity of the bank’s capital to absorb po-
tential large losses and to identify steps the bank can take to reduce 
its risk and conserve capital. This assessment is integral to setting 
and evaluating the bank’s management strategy and the results of 
stress testing should be routinely communicated to senior manage-
ment and, periodically, to the bank’s board of directors.  
 The Committee tied the “qualitative 
criteria” to deliberation-oriented stress testing themes of (1) 
use of imagination to identify threats to firm objectives; (2) 
regular communication of test results to senior management 
and the board of directors; and (3) dialogue with regulators: 
. . . . 
. . . Moreover, if the testing reveals particular vulnerability to a given 
set of circumstances, the national authorities would expect the bank 
to take prompt steps to manage those risks appropriately . . . .233
Later that same year, U.S. bank regulators implemented 
the market risk capital adequacy regime, but they did not spec-
ify how the stress tests were to be conducted, leaving it instead 
to industry to develop best practices for stress testing.
 
234 Four 
years later in 2000, the OCC published related guidance on 
model validation that impliedly touched on stress tests by men-
tioning the importance of “understanding . . .a model’s 
strengths and weaknesses.”235
When the Basel Committee extended this internal models 
approach to the credit and operational risk capital charges in 
2004, it again reiterated that the statistical models being used 
to generate required minimum capital levels would need to be 
subjected to stress testing.
  
236
 
 232. Id. 
 With this reform, known as “Basel 
II” to distinguish it from the initial 1988 Basel Accord on credit 
risk, the Committee took a step back from deliberation-oriented 
 233. Id. 
 234. See Risk-Based Capital Standards: Market Risk, 61 Fed. Reg. 47,358, 
47,363 (Sept. 6, 1996). 
 235. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. NO. 
2000-16, MODEL VALIDATION 2 (2000), available at http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/ 
media/resources/3676/occ-bl2000-16_risk_model_validation.pdf.  
 236. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVER-
GENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 205, 207–08 
(2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf. 
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stress testing.237 Basel II required banks to have in place 
“sound stress testing processes” that identify “unfavourable ef-
fects on a [bank]’s credit exposures.”238 Moreover, the reform 
imposed a new requirement: banks would have to design and 
perform a sensitivity analysis—labeled the “credit risk stress 
test”—subject to regulatory supervision.239 The Committee’s 
guidance on the test, however, was hesitant and assurance-
focused. For instance, it noted that “the objective is not to re-
quire banks to consider worst-case scenarios” and that the test 
“should . . . consider at least the effect of mild recession scenar-
ios” such as “two consecutive quarters of zero growth to assess 
the effect on the banks’ [credit exposure].”240
The middle-of-decade period marks an inflection point in 
the history of regulatory engagement with stress testing. Regu-
lators intermittently touched on stress testing in guidance to 
supervised institutions. For instance, U.S. bank regulators re-
sponded to signs of a bubble in commercial real estate in 2006 
by publishing guidance encouraging, but neither requiring nor 
prescribing specific methodologies for, banks to conduct portfo-
lio-level stress tests so as to “quantify the impact of changing 
economic scenarios on asset quality, earnings, and capital.”
 Compared with the 
Committee’s earlier treatment of market risk stress testing re-
quirements, the Committee’s conservatism in the credit risk 
context is apparent. 
241
During this period, regulators discovered that their ability 
to foster effective stress testing systems within banks had fall-
en well short of their expectations.
  
242 In 2006, the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB)—the lead U.S. 
regulator for bank holding company groups—reviewed bank 
stress testing practices at large, complex banking groups.243 The 
FRB conducted the study to facilitate its institutional under-
standing of the full range of stress testing practices, an urgent 
task because “there was neither a well-developed set of best 
practices nor supervisory guidance in this area at the time.”244
 
 237. Id. at 2–5.  
 
The study found that none of the banking groups had an inte-
 238. Id. at 266. 
 239. Id. at 96–97.  
 240. Id. 
 241. Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk Man-
agement Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2307 (Jan. 13, 2006). 
 242. GAO Risk Management Oversight Assessment, supra note 116, at 4. 
 243. Id. at 23.  
 244. See id.  
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grated stress testing program that incorporated all major fi-
nancial risks on an enterprise-wide basis.245 Instead, banks 
were stress testing the impact of adverse events on individual 
products and business lines rather than on the institution as a 
whole and missing any dynamic interaction among risk factors 
or portfolio exposures.246 Even more troubling, none of the 
groups were regularly conducting worst-case scenario analysis 
involving insolvency scenarios.247
A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report summa-
rizing the FRB study reads like a tutorial on how an assurance-
oriented stress testing approach, and the corresponding de-
emphasis of active deliberation, can overwhelm both regulators 
and risk management departments: 
  
[O]fficials told us that the current crisis had gone beyond what they 
had contemplated for a worst-case scenario, and they said that they 
would probably have faced significant resistance had they tried to re-
quire the institutions to do stress tests for scenarios such as down-
grades in counterparties’ credit ratings because such scenarios ap-
peared unlikely. Other regulators raised concerns about stress testing 
at individual institutions, but we did not find evidence that they had 
effectively changed the firms’ stress testing practices. In the materials 
we reviewed, one regulator recommended that the institution include 
worst-case scenarios in its testing. In a 2005 examination report, ex-
aminers noted a concern about the level of senior management over-
sight of risk tolerances. This concern primarily stemmed from lack of 
documentation, stress testing, and communication of firm risk toler-
ances and the extent to which these were reflected in stress tests. 
While the firm later took steps to document formal risk tolerances 
and communicate this throughout the firm, the recommendation re-
lated to stress testing remained open through 2008.248
A 2005 study conducted by a committee at the Bank for In-
ternational Settlements found that the overwhelming majority 
of stress tests were being conducted on trading portfolios alone, 
and that stress testing of credit exposures lagged behind.
 
249 
Banks had made little progress at all in stress testing liquidity 
needs.250 The preponderant use of stress tests remained model 
validation.251
 
 245. Id. at 4. 
 A joint FRB-OCC horizontal review of model vali-
dation practices at large banks found that bank practices were 
deficient even for this basic assurance-oriented stress testing 
 246. Id. at 23. 
 247. Id. at 22–24.  
 248. Id. at 24. 
 249. BIS, STRESS TESTING PAPER, supra note 59, at 9, 14.  
 250. Id. at 14; Taleb et al., supra note 165, at 5.  
 251. BIS, STRESS TESTING PAPER, supra note 59, at 5. 
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function.252
As with most other issues, the success of a stress testing program de-
pends importantly on the support and sponsorship provided by senior 
management. In banks where risk management functions did not per-
form well, stress testing typically was a mechanical exercise. Man-
agement viewed stress tests as more of a ‘‘requirement’’ than an im-
portant risk management tool that could lead to internal discussions 
and debate about whether existing exposures constituted unaccepta-
ble risks.
 When testifying before Congress in 2009, former 
Chief National Examiner for the OCC levied a sobering as-
sessment of the extent of managerial deliberation on stress:  
253
These inadequacies in stress testing practices contributed to 
the financial crisis that started in 2007 and persists today in 
the form of a debt overhang, particularly in Europe.
 
254
C. A NEW PHASE OF POST-2008 STRESS TESTING REGULATION 
  
Following the recent financial crisis, stress testing regula-
tion has been characterized by two trends that have little in 
common beyond their invocation of the stress test label.255 On 
the one hand, regulators have redoubled their isolated, “one-
off” regulator-conducted stress tests.256 Regulators initiated this 
process, and Congress subsequently enshrined it as a mandato-
ry, periodic feature of U.S. bank supervision in the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.257 In 
the European Union, regulators’ use of stress remains more ad 
hoc, though not less prevalent.258
 
 252. GAO Risk Management Oversight Assessment, supra note 
 On the other hand, bank regu-
lators, under the auspices of the Basel Committee, registered 
their collective failure to embed deliberation-oriented stress 
testing norms into the corporate governance infrastructure of 
116, at 21 
(finding banks “lacked requirements for model testing, clearly defined roles 
and responsibilities for testing, adequate detail for the scope or frequency of 
validation, and a specific process for correcting problems identified during val-
idation”). 
 253. Long Statement, supra note 45, at 75. 
 254. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR EN-
HANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2, 4–5 (2010), available at http://www 
.bis.org/publ/bcbs176.pdf. 
 255. See infra Part IV.C.1–2. 
 256. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 257. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
§ 165(i), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1430 (2010).  
 258. Huw Jones, BoE’s Cunliffe Says EU Banks Tests Must Be Credible, 
REUTERS (March 4, 2014), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/04/uk-britain 
-boe-cunliffe-idUKBREA230S920140304.  
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regulated banks and provided more detailed guidance.259
1. Regulator-Conducted Assurance-Oriented Stress Testing 
 The 
former trend is solidly an assurance-related effort, and the lat-
ter trend is a more ambitious, if undeveloped, deliberation-
related effort.  
The regulator-conducted stress testing initiatives are a 
transatlantic phenomenon, and are characterized by several of 
the hallmarks of assurance-oriented stress testing: partial equi-
librium assumptions; static scenarios; precise estimation; and 
sensitivity to audience perception. In the United States, the 
early 2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) 
saw U.S. bank regulators conduct a highly publicized, isolated, 
“one-off” stress test of the nineteen largest bank holding com-
panies. The tests were designed to gauge whether firms would 
remain sufficiently capitalized in the event of a regulator-
designed “worse than expected” recession scenario.260 This ad-
verse scenario tracked real GDP, unemployment and housing 
prices.261 If the results demonstrated to regulators that an addi-
tional capital buffer was warranted, the banks would be re-
quired to raise capital from private investors or, that failing, 
the U.S. Treasury.262 Regulators openly admitted that this was 
not a typical supervisory exercise to gauge banking resilience, 
and instead was designed in large part in the service of trans-
parency and bolstering confidence.263 To many in the financial 
community, the stress tests’ purpose was plainly to reassure 
the public of the solvency of the sector.264
 
 259. See infra Part IV.C.2.  
  
 260. See Timothy Geithner, How We Tested the Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 7, 2009, at A33. 
 261. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE SUPERVISORY 
CAPITAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 6 (2009), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/bcreg20090424a1.pdf. 
 262. Press Release, Joint Statement by the Treasury, FDIC, OCC, OTS, 
and the Federal Reserve (Feb. 23, 2009), available at http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20090223a.htm. The results of the stress 
tests suggested that the 19 banks would stand to lose about $600 billion in the 
event the severe scenario materialized. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RE-
SERVE SYS., THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: OVERVIEW OF 
RESULTS 3 (2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
press/bcreg/bcreg20090507a1.pdf.  
 263. See, e.g., Geithner, supra note 260, at A33. 
 264. See Andrews & Dash, supra note 7, at B4 (quoting a banking analyst’s 
opinion that bank regulators “are designing [the stress tests] to make it sound 
like the banking system is in great shape”). 
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Since 2011, the Dodd-Frank Act has required the FRB to 
conduct annual stress tests—which form part of the FRB’s new 
Regulation YY and are referred to as “Dodd-Frank Act Stress 
Tests” or “DFASTs”—of bank holding companies with total con-
solidated assets greater than $50 billion and financial institu-
tions designated by the FSOC as systemically significant.265 
Subject companies are referred to as “covered companies.”266 
The DFAST program projects revenues, expenses, losses, and 
the resulting post-stress capital ratios based on three hypothet-
ical scenarios of increasing degrees of adverseness: a baseline 
scenario, an adverse scenario, and a severely adverse scenar-
io.267 The FRB applies the scenarios in a rigid and uniform 
manner to all subject companies.268
As noted earlier,
  
269 the Dodd-Frank Act also mandated that 
covered companies conduct their own DFAST semi-annual 
stress tests in the first and third quarters (the FRB refers to 
the third-quarter tests as “mid-cycle” to distinguish them from 
the first-quarter tests).270 Regulation YY requires covered com-
panies to use the FRB’s own scenarios when conducting annual 
stress tests.271 As such, the company-conducted, first-quarter 
stress test amounts to little more than an arithmetic verifica-
tion exercise.272
 
 265. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a), (i)(1) (2012). The institutions subject to these 
tests are identical to the set of institutions subject to the internal stress test-
ing requirement. See supra note 
 By contrast, the covered companies themselves 
are responsible for formulating the scenarios used in the mid-
8. 
 266. 12 C.F.R. § 252.132(e) (2013). 
 267. 12 C.F.R. § 252.132 (2013); BD. OF GOVERNORS. OF THE FED. RESERVE 
SYS., DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS TEST 2013: SUPERVISORY STRESS TEST METH-
ODOLOGY AND RESULTS 2 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 DFAST RESULTS], available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/dfast_2013_results_ 
20130314.pdf. 
 268. 2013 DFAST RESULTS, supra note 267, at 3. 
 269. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 270. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., DODD-FRANK ACT 
MID-CYCLE STRESS TESTS 2013: SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS (2013), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20130513a1.pdf. 
 271. See 12 C.F.R. § 252.144(b) (2013); Supervisory and Company-Run 
Stress Test Requirements for Covered Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,378, 62,387 
(Oct 12, 2012) (“For the annual stress test, covered companies will use the 
same scenarios as the Board will use for its supervisory stress analysis.”). 
 272. It might be objected that the timing of the provision of the results of 
the annual stress tests makes the requirement more meaningful. Covered 
companies must provide their results to the FRB by January 5, but the FRB 
must publish its results only by March 31. Id. at 62,383 tbl.1. As a result, the 
FRB obtains insight into the covered company’s general orientation toward the 
stress testing exercise. 
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cycle stress tests.273 As with the regulator-conducted stress 
tests, the scenarios must consist, at a minimum, of a baseline 
scenario, an adverse scenario, and a severely adverse scenar-
io.274 Covered companies are to disclose publicly their pro forma 
capital levels in the event, however unlikely, that the scenarios 
come to pass.275
The FRB instructions to firms for the mid-cycle tests are, 
in marked contrast to the prescriptive, top-down approach to 
the first-quarter tests, open-ended and indeterminate: 
 
The Board anticipates that covered companies may use a variety of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches to develop the scenarios. The 
adverse and severely adverse scenarios used in mid-cycle stress tests 
should reflect a company’s unique vulnerabilities to factors that affect 
its firm-wide activities and risk exposures, including macroeconomic, 
market-wide, and firm-specific events. The Board expects the compa-
nies to consider their own risk profiles and operations in designing 
specific elements of the adverse and severely adverse scenarios.276
As with all open-ended regulatory dictates, its effectiveness 
will depend on the vigor with which the FRB engages with 
bank management. If these discussions are robust, it should be 
expected that the FRB-formulated scenarios will be improved. 
The track record of regulators on this score is not good, though 
the optimist might see substantial room for improvement. 
 
The results of the DFAST tests are taken into account in a 
subsequent capital plan review277 process during which the 
FRB evaluates each covered company’s capital plan.278
 
 273. 12 C.F.R. § 252.145(b) (2013). 
 Specifi-
 274. See Supervisory and Company-Run Stress Test Requirements for Cov-
ered Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. at 62,387. 
 275. Id. at 62,379. Because this is a forward-looking computation, the rule 
incorporates assumptions with respect to dividends, repurchases, redemp-
tions, and additional capital raises during the prospective period over which 
the test spans. 
 276. Id. at 62,387. 
 277. The capital plan review grows out of, and integrates as a regular fea-
ture of banking supervision, the FRB’s initial Comprehensive Capital Analysis 
and Review (CCAR), conducted in 2010. With the CCAR, the FRB assessed the 
capital adequacy and the internal capital planning processes of the same 
large, complex bank holding companies that participated in the 2009 SCAP 
stress test exercise. Policy Statement on the Scenario Design Framework for 
Stress Testing, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,124, 70,124–25 (Nov. 23, 2012). 
 278. The FRB requires covered companies to submit annual capital plans 
for consideration by the FRB. Capital Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 74,631, 74,633–34 
(Dec. 1, 2011). The mandatory elements of a capital plan organize into four 
components:  
(i) an assessment of the expected uses and sources of capital over the 
planning horizon (at least nine quarters, beginning with the quarter 
preceding the quarter in which the bank holding company submits its 
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cally, the FRB assesses whether the covered companies have 
robust, forward-looking capital planning processes and have 
sufficient capital to continue operations throughout times of 
economic and financial stress. If, after consideration of, among 
other things, the DFAST results, the FRB does not approve of 
the capital plan, the covered company is prohibited from engag-
ing in any “capital distribution.”279 Under the capital plan re-
view program, the FRB requires that covered companies main-
tain a minimum 5% core tier 1 capital ratio even under the 
severely adverse scenario.280 If the covered company cannot 
demonstrate its ability to meet that standard, the FRB will re-
ject its capital plan.281 This power expands the FRB’s formal ar-
senal beyond its traditional powers under the prompt corrective 
action regime in place since 1992.282 The capital plan review 
and the DFAST program represent a substantial strengthening 
of previous approaches to assessing capital adequacy and pro-
moting best practices at large banks for measuring capital 
needs and for managing and allocating capital resources.283
 
capital plan) that reflects the bank holding company’s size, complexi-
ty, risk profile, and scope of operations, assuming both expected and 
stressful conditions; (ii) a detailed description of the bank holding 
company’s process for assessing capital adequacy; (iii) the bank hold-
ing company’s capital policy; and (iv) a discussion of any expected 
changes to the bank holding company’s business plan that are likely 
to have a material impact on the firm’s capital adequacy or liquidity.  
  
Id. at 74,634. The rule requires each covered company capital plan to consider 
the effects of, in addition to the FRB-formulated stress scenarios, at least one 
stress scenario developed by the covered company itself. Id. at 74,635. The 
FRB, after review of the capital plan, may approve the plan, disapprove the 
plan, or require re-submission of the plan. Id. at 74,638–41; see also Policy 
Statement on the Scenario Design Framework for Stress Testing, 77 Fed. Reg. 
at 70,125 (noting that the capital plan review “ties the review of a bank hold-
ing company’s performance under stress scenarios to its ability to make capital 
distributions”). 
 279. For purposes of its capital plan review rule, the FRB defines “capital 
distribution” as “a redemption or repurchase of any debt or equity capital in-
strument, a payment of common or preferred stock dividends, a payment that 
may be temporarily or permanently suspended by the issuer on any instru-
ment that is eligible for inclusion in the numerator of any minimum regulato-
ry capital ratio, and any similar transaction that the Federal Reserve deter-
mines to be in substance a distribution of capital.” Id. at 74,637. 
 280. BD. OF GOVERNORS. OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAP-
ITAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2013: ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 11 
(2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/ 
ccar-2013-results-20130314.pdf. 
 281. See supra note 278. 
 282. See Weber, supra note 10, at 717 n.287. 
 283. Id. At present, the capital plan review applies to the nineteen largest 
bank holding companies, while the DFAST program applies to a broader range 
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In 2010, European Union (EU) authorities established the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) as an EU-level banking 
supervisor and charged it with, among other things, adminis-
tering EU-wide stress tests on EU-domiciled banks.284 The EU 
lawmaking institutions created the EBA to replace the Com-
mittee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), which had 
been created in 2004 to encourage supervisory coordination and 
information sharing among EU member state bank supervisors 
and promote consistent implementation of EU banking laws 
and regulation.285 As problems in peripheral EU state banking 
sectors attracted attention, CEBS conducted an initial round of 
stress tests in May of 2009 that modeled gross domestic prod-
uct, unemployment rates, and real estate market prices.286 The 
CEBS conducted a second round of tests in 2010 and the newly 
formed EBA conducted its first round of tests in 2011.287 The 
EU stress tests operate similarly to the FRB’s capital plan re-
view program; banks were required in July 2011 to raise addi-
tional core tier 1 capital to the extent that they would have less 
than 5% core tier 1 capital ratio under the adverse scenario.288
 
of institutions based on the statutory threshold. Press Release, Bd. of Gover-
nors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Stress Tests and Capital Planning, (Feb. 25, 
2014), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/stress-tests 
-capital-planning.htm. 
 
In December of 2011, the EBA raised its required threshold to 
 284. See Council Regulation 1093/2010, art. 20(2)(b), 2010 O.J. (L 331) 12, 
29 (EU). Specifically, the EBA stress tests are intended “to assess the resili-
ence of financial institutions . . . to adverse market developments, and [and to] 
evaluate the potential for systemic risk to increase in situations of stress, en-
suring that a consistent methodology is applied at the national level to such 
tests.” Id. As of mid-2013, there is speculation that the EBA will be dissolved 
in connection with the creation of a Eurozone-wide banking union. Patrick 
Jenkins, European Banks Lift Capital Buffers, FIN. TIMES, July 12, 2012, at 
16. 
 285. About CEBS, CEBS Archive, EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY, http:// 
www.eba.europa.eu/cebs-archive (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).  
 286. Press Release, Comm. of Eur. Banking Supervisors, Results of the EU-
Wide Stress Testing Exercise, (Oct. 1, 2009) available at http://www.eba 
.europa.eu/documents/10180/15977/CEBS-2009-180-Annex-2-%28Press 
-release-from-CEBS%29.PDF. 
 287. EUR. BANKING AUTH., 2011 EU-WIDE STRESS TESTS: AGGREGATE RE-
SULTS 3 (2011) [hereinafter AGGREGATE RESULTS], available at http://www.eba 
.europa.eu/documents/10180/15935/EBA_ST_2011_Summary_Report_v6.pdf/ 
54a9ec8e-3a44-449f-9a5f-e820cc2c2f0a. 
 288. Id. at 38. 
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9%, making it decidedly more stringent than the U.S. capital 
plan review.289
These stress tests illustrate several shortcomings with as-
surance-oriented stress testing. The first shortcoming is a dan-
ger against which all stress tests should guard: undue opti-
mism. For example, the dire scenario regulators presented as a 
“more adverse scenario” in the February 2009 SCAP program 
appeared anodyne by April of 2009.
 
290 The 2010 CEBS stress 
test exercise in Europe gave a clean bill of health to all but sev-
en of the ninety-one tested banks, identifying an aggregate cap-
ital shortfall of only €3.5 billion.291 Four months later, the Eu-
ropean Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and 
the European Union announced a bailout of Ireland that allo-
cated €10 billion—and made available another €25 billion—to 
recapitalize the banks of Ireland alone!292 Furthermore, Greek 
banks and Spanish cajas (savings banks) passed the 2010 
CEBS stress tests, just months before requiring unprecedented 
levels of public assistance.293 Banks from the most recent Euro-
zone bailout recipient, Cyprus, passed the stress tests in 2010 
and 2011 because the adverse scenario did not contemplate the 
possibility of losses on government bonds.294 This was no minor 
omission; the primary cause of uncertainty in the banking sec-
tor at the time was exposure to sovereign bonds.295
 
 289. Patrick Jenkins, Pretending the World Is Fixed Is a Gamble, FIN. 
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7cc387cc-775c-11e1-93cb 
-00144feab49a.html. 
 The Franco-
 290. See Wessel, supra note 2, at A2. 
 291. Patrick Jenkins & Brooke Masters, Bank Watchdog Sets out to Square 
the Circle, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d70dd886 
-3865-11e0-959c-00144feabdc0.html. 
 292. See Patrick Jenkins, Bail-out Document Runs Dry on Tackling Liquid-
ity Issue, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2010, at 20. 
 293. See David Enrich, New Doubts on EU Bank Stress Tests, WALL ST. J., 
July 20, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527487047200 
04575377202517842246 (noting that stress tests by market researchers at an-
other bank estimated that the cajas alone would face a €50 billion shortfall in 
the event of a severe downturn). 
 294. David Enrich & Charles Forelle, Greek Bets Sank Top Lenders, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 27, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873 
23501004578386762342123182. 
 295. Patrick Jenkins, Power to the Regulators, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2011, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c1266a8a-24e4-11e1-8bf9-00144feabdc0.html 
(“When the EBA ran [its 2011] stress test[s] . . . it applied bleak forecasts for 
what might happen to European economic growth, unemployment and proper-
ty prices, but in the face of political hostility from European Union leaders, it 
stopped short of applying market valuations of peripheral sovereign debt—
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Belgian bank Dexia passed the 2011 stress test, only to require 
France and Belgium to assure investors of their readiness to 
guarantee Dexia’s obligations three months later.296 Eventually, 
in December of 2011, the EBA updated its stress tests to take 
into account a modest loss on sovereign bond holdings.297 Exces-
sive optimism is not limited to scenario design. The U.S. capital 
plan review program’s requirement that covered companies 
maintain tier 1 capital ratios of 5%, after all, sets a bar that is 
actually lower than the Basel III capital ratios that U.S. bank 
regulators agreed to implement by 2015.298
A second shortcoming, which is related to the first, flows 
from having hybrid intended audiences: on the one hand, the 
tests were designed to advert supervisors to problem institu-
tions. But on the other hand, they were designed to communi-
cate to markets and investors that the financial system was 
sound.
 
299 Several industry commentators had expressed skepti-
cism about the “adversity” of the “more adverse scenario” on 
these grounds.300 A Royal Bank of Scotland economist voiced 
the concern, stating “If you do have the Greek banks pass the 
tests, there may still be some skepticism in the markets about 
whether or not they’ve been rigorous and whether they’ve been 
a true test of the system.”301
 
precisely the issue that was at the heart of investors nervousness about banks’ 
financial strength.”). 
 Arguing in favor of “realistic” se-
vere scenarios, Financial Times banking commentator Wolf-
gang Münchau discusses the tension between the political and 
diagnostic functions of the EBA stress tests: 
 296. Jill Treanor, How Did Europe’s Bank Stress Tests Give Dexia a Clean 
Bill of Health?, THE GUARDIAN BUSINESS BLOG (Oct. 5, 2011, 4:10 PM), http:// 
www.guardian.co.uk/business/blog/2011/oct/05/europe-bank-stress-tests-dexia.  
 297. Jenkins, supra note 295, at 14. 
 298. Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Ba-
sel III, Minimum Regulatory Capital Ratios, Capital Adequacy, Transition 
Provisions, and Prompt Corrective Action, 77 Fed. Reg. 52,792, 52,824 tbl.9 
(Aug. 30, 2012). 
 299. Jenkins & Masters, supra note 1 (“The EBA’s aims are twofold: first, 
to strengthen the system by pushing banks that are thinly capitalised relative 
to their underlying risks into raising fresh equity: and second, to convince the 
world about that strength—helping investors, particularly from outside Eu-
rope, to differentiate among eurozone banks and stop shunning them en 
masse.”). 
 300. See Andrews & Dash, supra note 7, at B1, B4 (reporting that a bank 
analyst found the more adverse scenario assumptions “too optimistic” and 
“[not] harsh enough”—in particular with respect to the expected growth to be 
generated from 2009 federal stimulus spending). 
 301. Enrich, supra note 293. 
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First, by realistic stress I mean the inclusion of extreme, not probable, 
worst-case scenarios. Given the recent discussions about Greece, this 
must include the worst estimates of a “haircut”—a deduction suffered 
by bondholders—of about 50 per cent of the face value of Greek bonds. 
The stress tests will, according to reports last week, include a uniform 
haircut on sovereign bonds of 3 per cent. This number is a joke. Some 
institutions will have a stronger exposure to Greece, Portugal, Ireland 
or Spain than others, and it is important that those banks are 
stressed on the assumption of significant haircuts of their sovereign 
risk portfolios. I can see the politics behind the 3 per cent figure. It is 
official EU policy to deny the reality that Greece might default or re-
structure. A genuine stress test might expose the EU’s position as in-
defensible. Those opposed to any inclusion of sovereign risk into the 
stress tests argue that the mere assumption of a haircut might turn 
into a self-fulfilling prophecy. The market would jump to the wrong 
conclusions. This is a silly argument. Stress test scenarios are not 
forecasts. They are only scenarios, of the kind that market partici-
pants have already factored into the pricing of bonds.302
A third shortcoming is that the scenarios are drawn from 
historical precedents. For example, in 2011 the EBA used loan 
loss provision and profitability data from 2009 as a benchmark 
in setting the “adverse” scenario.
 
303
A fourth shortcoming is that these stress tests are static 
and assume partial equilibrium models of the financial system. 
As a result, they do not capture vulnerabilities to liquidity 
crunches and other more dynamic phenomena. The FRB 
acknowledges that the DFAST tests are limited by their partial 
equilibrium assumptions: “These projections incorporate a 
number of conservative modeling assumptions, but do not make 
explicit behavioral assumptions about the possible actions of a 
BHC’s creditors and counterparties in the scenario, except 
through the severely adverse scenario’s characterizations of fi-
 Historical scenarios are not 
intrinsically suspect, and their use is a key part of any stress 
testing program; to eliminate them would be to avoid learning 
from history. Nevertheless, the regulatory imposition of a uni-
tary scenario on all banks (as occurs under both the EBA and 
DFAST test programs) means that banks and regulators are 
not engaged in a dialogic, iterative process of scenario develop-
ment that can harness the imagination of multiple actors. The 
need to develop a scenario leads naturally to an overreliance on 
historical precedents, which are identifiable, numerous, and as 
to which regulators have reliable data.  
 
 302. Wolfgang Münchau, Europe Risks Failing the Real Test on Banks, FIN. 
TIMES, Jul. 5, 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a989f262-879b-11df-9f37 
-00144feabdc0.html. 
 303. AGGREGATE RESULTS, supra note 287.  
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nancial asset prices and economic activity.”304
2. Basel Committee Principles: An Overture to Deliberation-
Oriented Stress Testing? 
 These assurance-
related shortcomings limit the effectiveness of these otherwise 
encouraging programs. 
While the global financial system was still in the throes of 
the 2008 financial crisis, the Basel Committee published a se-
ries of stress testing “principles” to guide bank management 
and bank supervisors in their efforts to promote effective stress 
testing programs.305 Noting that it had already required banks 
to maintain rigorous stress testing programs in place, the 
Committee registered its disappointment with the track record 
of stress testing.306 The document’s definition of stress test is 
noteworthy: “A stress test is commonly described as the evalua-
tion of a bank’s financial position under a severe but plausible 
scenario to assist in decision making within the bank.”307
(1) Supervisors should make regular and comprehensive as-
sessments of a bank’s stress testing program.
 As 
discussed at length in Part IV.B, it is, in light of the predomi-
nance of assurance-oriented stress testing regulatory efforts, an 
exaggeration to describe the connection between stress testing 
and firm decision-making as a “commonly” shared precept. 
Nevertheless, in the document the Committee envisages a new 
role for bank regulators that resonates with deliberation-
oriented stress testing. The supervisory principles are set forth 
below, with brief descriptions of how they might be used to fos-
ter deliberation: 
308
(2) Supervisors should require management to take corrective 
action if material deficiencies in the stress testing program 
are identified or if the results of stress tests are not adequate-
 By regularly re-
viewing stress test programs and scenarios, regulators will be able (1) 
to identify those “good actor” institutions that deliberate more active-
ly on the possibilities or failure and (2) to present scenarios identified 
by the good actors prospectively to institutions with assurance-
oriented stress testing mindsets. 
 
 304. 2013 DFAST RESULTS, supra note 267. 
 305. BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 46. 
 306. Id. at 1 (lamenting the failure of bank stress tests to “produce large 
loss numbers in relation to their capital buffers . . . or their actual loss experi-
ence” and to “include[] more severe scenarios”); see also supra notes 230–41 
and accompanying text (discussing the Committee’s actions to require rigorous 
stress testing programs). 
 307. BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 2. 
 308. Id. at 17.  
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ly taken into consideration in the decision-making process.
309
(3) Supervisors should assess and, if necessary, challenge the 
scope and severity of firm-wide scenarios, including by re-
quiring reverse stress tests. The reference to reverse stress tests—
which intrinsically require active deliberation on the channels 
through which failure might emerge
 
Here, the Committee expressly links the stress testing program to de-
cision-making and corporate governance. If stress testing is limited to 
a verification process performed by risk management departments 
without interaction with other business units, regulators should be 
empowered to intervene. 
310
(4) Supervisors should examine banks’ stress test results when 
assessing whether banks have adequate capital and liquidity 
on a forward-looking basis. The Committee notes that 
“[s]upervisors should . . . be able to understand the rationale for man-
agement decisions to take or not to take remedial actions” in response 
to the results of its stress tests. This again implies regular dialogue 
with bank management concerning stress and failure and responses 
thereto. With respect to liquidity risk management, which is, as dis-
cussed above, rarely susceptible to assurance-type modeling, the 
Committee notes that regulators “should review the use of stress test 
results to ensure that the potential impact on a bank’s liquidity is ful-
ly considered and discussed at senior management level.”
—again suggests a delibera-
tion-oriented stress testing approach.  
311
(5) Supervisors should be adequately resourced and technical-
ly able, and should engage in dialogue with other public au-
thorities and industry to identify systemic vulnerabilities and 
the ways in which they might unfold.
 
312
 The Committee states its 
hope that regulators and industry engage in a “constructive, system-
atic dialogue” concerning “which scenarios could unfold and [which] 
systemic interactions could crystallise.”
313
 If regulators have the abil-
ity and resources to contribute meaningfully to this dialogue, includ-
ing by resisting tendencies to oversimplify, they will contribute to a 
better understanding of the causal environment in which financial in-
stitutions operate.
314
 
 309. Id.  
  
 310. See supra Part II.C.1.b. 
 311. BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 19. 
 312. Id.  
 313. Id.  
 314. Each of these supervisory principles is explained in greater detail in 
the Basel Committee document. See id. at 17–19. A sixth supervisory principle 
instructs regulators to “consider implementing stress test exercises based on 
common [regulator-provided] scenarios” so as to complement banks’ own in-
ternal stress tests and better enable regulators to understand the possible im-
pact of specific stress events. Id. at 19. The EBA stress tests and the FRB post-
crisis activities respond directly to this charge, see supra notes 264–68, 284 
and accompanying text, but the Basel Committee emphasizes that these “su-
pervisory stress tests should on their own not be considered as sufficient” and 
that regulators “should make clear that these are not a substitute for stress 
tests designed by bank management, given that a common supervisory scenar-
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These principles espouse expectations that bank regulators will 
learn from the financial crisis and adopt a deliberation-oriented 
stress testing approach. The OCC’s Chief Bank Examiner has 
publicly touted the OCC’s role in developing these Basel princi-
ples.315 And the Basel Committee has reiterated them in subse-
quent publications.316
V. THREE PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE USE OF 
REGULATION TO INSTITUTIONALIZE DELIBERATION-
ORIENTED STRESS TESTING  
 The EBA stress tests in Europe and the 
DFAST and capital plan review program in the United States 
demonstrate, however, that regulators have a long way to go to 
operationalize the principles. 
The limited progress to institutionalize deliberation-
oriented stress testing—both at the regulatory level and at the 
industry level—is to some extent understandable. Deliberation 
on remote possibilities of future contingent states, however cat-
astrophic, does not come naturally.317 Sociologist Carol Heimer 
has coined the term “bounded imagination” to describe how 
“people . . . have rather limited capacities to imagine alterna-
tives to the one that exists or that they have chosen.”318
The report on the 1986 space shuttle Challenger disaster 
notes that when it came to formulating pre-launch estimates of 
 The 
problem is only exacerbated in bureaucratic environments with 
multiple corporate actors, stakeholders, and goals—or where, 
as with large global corporations, managers face competing 
demands on their attention spans in a high-pressure environ-
ment. 
 
io [such as are provided in the DFAST exercise] is not tailored to the unique 
characteristics of individual banks.” BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, su-
pra note 46, at 19. 
 315. See Long Statement, supra note 45, at 79. 
 316. See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCEMENTS TO 
THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK 25 (2009), available at https://www.bis.org/publ/ 
bcbs157.pdf (“Supervisors should assess the effectiveness of banks’ stress test-
ing programme in identifying relevant vulnerabilities. Supervisors should re-
view the key assumptions driving stress testing results and challenge their 
continuing relevance in view of existing and potentially changing market con-
ditions. Supervisors should challenge banks on how stress testing is used and 
the way it affects decision-making. Where this assessment reveals material 
shortcomings, supervisors should require a bank to detail a plan of corrective 
action.”). 
 317. See PARKER, supra note 10, at 60–61. 
 318. Carol A. Heimer, Legislating Responsibility 25 (Am. Bar Found., 
Working Paper No. 9711, 1997). 
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the probability of a loss of vehicle and of human life, the shuttle 
engineers and the NASA management had wildly different in-
tuitions.319 The engineers, true to their safety-minded profes-
sional ethos, estimated odds of mission failure up to 1000 times 
higher than those of managers.320 After discussing this discrep-
ancy, the report poses the obvious question: “What is the cause 
of management’s fantastic faith in the machinery?”321 Financial 
regulators could pose a similar question with respect to manag-
ers at the firms they supervise: what is the cause of manage-
ment’s fantastic faith in their risk management systems?322
It goes without saying that using public regulatory power 
to institutionalize deliberation-oriented stress testing within 
financial firms presents unique challenges. The open-ended and 
indeterminate character of its outputs is a poor fit for the tradi-
tional administrative agency’s toolkit.
 
More important for purposes of this Article, however, is the 
likely follow-up question: “How can we use regulations in a 
manner that encourages managers, like engineers, to deliberate 
more actively on worst-case scenarios and, more generally, fail-
ure?” This Part takes up that question. 
323 To combat this dilem-
ma, regulators should bear in mind three themes in their dia-
logue with regulated firms over stress testing. First, they 
should understand their task as involving management-based 
regulation—a regulatory approach that acts on corporate plan-
ning processes rather than demanding specific technologies or 
outputs. Second, they should encourage the further develop-
ment of the “quantitative skepticism” that Anette Mikes, in her 
field research with bank risk management departments, has 
noted already exists in many large financial institutions.324 De-
liberation-oriented stress testing will have an easier time gain-
ing traction in a quantitatively skeptical risk management de-
partment.325
 
 319. II PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCI-
DENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT app. F, at F-1 (1986). 
 Third, regulators should draw from the examples 
provided by HROs such as nuclear power plants, aircraft carri-
 320. See id. 
 321. Id. 
 322. See BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 2 (“Stress 
testing practices at most banks . . . did not foster internal debate nor challenge 
prior assumptions such as the cost, risk and speed with which new capital 
could be raised or that positions could be hedged or sold.”). 
 323. See Weber, supra note 59, at 7. 
 324. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 325. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
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ers, air traffic control systems, and wildfire-fighting units. 
Management theorists have admired the ability of these HROs 
to maintain reliable, resilient performance even in conditions of 
uncertainty and volatility.326 In other words, the success of 
stress testing as a regulatory tool depends on whether regulat-
ed institutions implement HRO decision-making norms.327
A. MANAGEMENT-BASED REGULATION: UNDERSTANDING WHY 
STRESS TESTING MAKES SENSE AS A REGULATORY MECHANISM 
  
The wellness of fit between a regulatory instrument and a 
regulatory objective is a question that often goes under-
examined in the rush to construct a regulatory solution to a 
perceived market failure.328 Once the regulatory objective is de-
termined, however, the choice of instrument is the most critical 
task.329
Cary Coglianese and David Lazer present a typology of 
regulatory mechanisms that is instructive in this context. They 
describe a traditional dichotomy between technology-based 
regulation (TBR) and performance-based regulation (PBR) that 
dates to now-Justice Stephen Breyer’s academic administrative 
law work.
 While the appeal of stress and failure deliberation is in-
tuitive, reflection on regulatory design—thinking about the 
way we think about a regulatory tool—is indispensable.  
330 When administering TBR tools, regulators specify 
techniques, procedures, and restrictions.331 When administering 
PBR tools, regulators intervene at the output stage,332 as with 
Pigouvian taxes.333 TBR tools are useful where the regulated 
entities are relatively homogeneous and regulatory outputs—
i.e., the measure of social harm or good that prompted the regu-
latory intervention in the first place—are difficult to monitor.334
 
 326. See supra note 
 
By contrast, PBR tools work best where circumstances are het-
14. 
 327. See supra note 15.  
 328. Cf. Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, Really Responsive Regulation, 71 
MOD. L. REV. 59, 59 (2008) (discussing the difficulties inherent in regulatory 
response). 
 329. Id. (emphasizing that consideration of a regulatory approach must 
begin by asking “whether it offers assistance in addressing the challenges reg-
ulators face in practice”). 
 330. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 12, at 691–92. 
 331. See id. at 694. 
 332. See id. 
 333. Cf. PAUL KRUGMAN ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 271–73 (2d ed. 
2010) (describing Pigouvian taxes). 
 334. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 12, at 705. 
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erogeneous because they avoid frictions involved when TBR 
tools impose uniform, one-size-fits-all technologies.335 That said, 
in order for PBR tools to function the regulator must be able to 
monitor outputs in order to calibrate regulatory response in a 
valid manner; without easily monitored outputs, PBR tools will 
not work.336
To Coglianese and Lazer, the TBR-PBR dichotomy there-
fore provides no guidance to policymakers where the market is 
at once characterized by heterogeneous market actors and diffi-
cult-to-monitor regulatory outputs.
  
337 Their solution is to pro-
pose management-based regulation (MBR) as a third model of 
regulatory mechanism design.338 MBR describes when regula-
tors direct market actors to engage in a planning process that 
aims to achieve public goals.339 Market actors enjoy the freedom 
to fashion solutions to problems in ways that are sensitive to 
their local circumstances.340 The regulatory intervention occurs 
at the planning stage, with regulators helping and overseeing 
firms as they deliberate on how to best promote regulatory ob-
jectives.341 It offers the decentralized context-specificity of PBR 
without relying on precise measurements of outputs.342 Where 
policymakers have largely abandoned structural regulation and 
the regulated market is subject to endemic complexity, MBR is 
a naturally attractive approach.343
The idea of MBR resonates with many other theoretical 
orientations to administrative law and practice, including—to 
name a few—meta risk management,
 
344 new governance,345
 
 335. See id. at 725 (emphasizing the “flexibility” or performance-based reg-
ulation). 
 ex-
 336. See id. 
 337. See id. at 705. 
 338. See id. at 725–26. 
 339. See id. at 694. 
 340. Cf. id. at 726 (“Management-based regulation may be the best availa-
ble regulatory approach for problems that require fine-grained analysis of lo-
cal circumstances.”). 
 341. See id. at 694, 706. 
 342. See id. at 692. 
 343. Cf. id. at 702 (noting that MBR can be particularly important “espe-
cially with respect to problems that arise from breakdowns in complex systems 
or that require coordination among a large number of interactive human and 
technological processes”). 
 344. Cf. John Braithwaite, Meta Risk Management and Responsive Regula-
tion for Tax System Integrity, 25 LAW & POL’Y 1, 1–2 (2003) (introducing meta 
risk management as the concept of assessing or regulating the risk manage-
ment practices of corporations). 
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perimental governance,346 enforced self-regulation,347 contextu-
alizing regimes,348 collaborative governance,349 and meta-
regulation.350 It is not merely the TBR/PBR dichotomy that is at 
risk; the administrative state as traditionally conceived is con-
tested, as governance is pushed down and throughout what 
used to be termed the private sector. Rather than mandating 
specific procedures or outcomes, public power is used to influ-
ence the “attitudinal settings” of regulated firms that deter-
mine how they process, produce, deliberate on, and react to in-
formation.351 Policymakers seek to regulate the exercise of 
judgment—in the context of risk management, they engage in 
meta-risk management, or the risk management of risk man-
agement.352
 
 345. Cf. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 343–44 
(2004) (discussing the “paradigm shift from a regulatory to a governance mod-
el”); David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regula-
tion: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 
539, 541 (2006) (“These processes, which we will collectively label ‘new gov-
ernance’, may encourage experimentation; employ stakeholder participation to 
devise solutions; rely on broad framework agreements, flexible norms and re-
visable standards; and use benchmarks, indicators and peer review to ensure 
accountability.”). 
 
 346. Cf. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 288 (1998) (discussing experimental 
governance at local levels); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism 
and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 55 (2011) 
(“In experimentalist regimes, central institutions give autonomy to local ones 
to pursue generally declared goals.”). 
 347. Cf. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 102–
03 (1992) (discussing enforced self-regulation as “negotiations between state 
and individual firms that result in flexible, particularistic standards and en-
forcement”). 
 348. Cf. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: 
Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy 
Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1266 (2012) (“[I]nstead of making the 
decision directly, the officials charged with decisionmaking adopt the norma-
tive output of one or more specialized bodies of stakeholders.”). 
 349. Cf. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative 
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 (1997) (discussing general features of collabora-
tive governance, such as flexibility and interdependency). 
 350. Cf. PARKER, supra note 10, at 245–91 (discussing the regulation of 
corporate decision making). 
 351. See Baldwin & Black, supra note 328, at 68–70; David Hess & Cristie 
L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings: A New Approach to 
an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307, 327–29 (2008). 
 352. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and 
Regulation in a Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 681 (2010); Braithwaite, su-
pra note 344, at 2–3. 
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But what does it mean to re-focus the regulatory lens on 
the planning processes instead of specific technologies (as with 
TBR) or mandated outcomes (as with PBR)? On the one hand, 
this new focus on the planning stage could take the form of a 
one-step verification of corporate processes. On the other hand, 
it could focus on continuous learning, benchmarking, and iden-
tifying best practices on a rolling basis.353 This latter model of 
MBR regulation draws from “experimentalist” theories of gov-
ernance that are influenced by the pragmatist precept of the 
reciprocal determination of ends and means.354 The ends of fi-
nancial stability and safety and soundness are impacted by the 
means by which risk managers and executives implement cor-
porate risk governance systems. As such, solutions to regulato-
ry problems must be seen as provisional rather than static. 
Regulatory action should be “conversational” in nature and re-
sponsive not only to changing markets but also to the institu-
tional and functional contexts within which regulation oc-
curs.355 To a large degree, the choice between viewing MBR as 
process verification or as continuous learning represents the 
choice between assurance-oriented stress testing and delibera-
tion-oriented stress testing. And, for the same reasons applica-
ble in that context, continuous learning is preferable to periodic 
verification.356
Another concern to bear in mind is that opening up regula-
tion to participation by regulated firms presents the risk of a 
legitimacy deficit.
  
357 Whereas traditional administrative law 
provides for ample private sector participation, such participa-
tion is channeled through a pluralistic notice-and-comment 
process.358
 
 353. William H. Simon compares this sort of legal-regulatory regime to 
Toyota’s highly flexible, nonhierarchical production system—and in particular 
its commitment to having zero tolerance to failure and its ability to adapt to 
changing circumstances. See William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal 
Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU 
AND THE US 37, 44–45 (Gráinne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006). 
 By contrast, an experimentalist MBR approach to 
regulation is both too decentralized and too provisional to per-
mit a formal notice-and-comment process involving all affected 
stakeholders, including users of credit, providers of credit (par-
ticularly depositors and money market investors), and even 
 354. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 346, at 284–87. 
 355. See JULIA BLACK, RULES AND REGULATORS 37–44 (1997). 
 356. See supra Part III.B. 
 357. See Weber, supra note 227, at 850–52. 
 358. See Freeman, supra note 349, at 11–12. 
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taxpayers in their capacity as the ultimate providers of gov-
ernment guarantees.359 Instead, a better prototype is the fre-
quent and informal regulator-regulatee interaction of the bank 
examination. Because the bank examination occurs outside the 
gaze of the public, care must be given to ensure that MBR ini-
tiatives such as deliberation-oriented stress testing are not cap-
tured by industry on account of its privileged access to regula-
tors and role as information-provider.360
Direct stakeholder participation may very well prove un-
workable in this context. Nevertheless, although MBR neces-
sarily entails extensive involvement of industry actors in plan-
ning regulation, the legitimacy deficit is not a structural, 
endemic problem. It is at least theoretically possible for an in-
ternal industrial morality—which Neil Gunningham and Jo-
seph Rees define as “an industry-wide normative framework, a 
set of industrial principles and practices that defines right con-
duct as it spells out the industry’s public commitment to moral 
restraint and aspiration”
  
361
  If an organization has a well-developed internal morality—driven 
by the quest for excellence, sustained by the interplay of means and 
ends—the community’s strategy may well shift from external to inter-
nal control. Instead of demanding conformity to standards imposed by 
legislation and regulation, we may place greater reliance on moral 
development. In this way, the internal morality of an institution be-
comes a resource for public policy.
—to attenuate these concerns. MBR 
is therefore not only about innovating the regulatory toolkit by 
changing the instruments of regulators; it also relies to some 
extent on altering the objectives of regulated firms. Philip Selz-
nick makes this point:  
362
The introduction of morality into the discussion both com-
plicates and facilitates MBR regulatory programs. It facilitates 
a program to the extent that it offers a way to fill the legitima-
cy gap. But it complicates a program to the extent it delimits 
 
 
 359. Cf. id. at 83 (“[P]ursuit of collaboration requires efforts to transcend 
the familiar debates over controlling agency discretion and depends upon a 
willingness to experiment with nontraditional forms of accountability.”). 
 360. See Weber, supra note 227, at 850–54. 
 361. Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Insti-
tutional Perspective, 19 LAW & POL’Y 363, 376 (1997); see also PARKER, supra 
note 10, at 295–97 (stating that harnessing industrial morality for public regu-
latory objectives depends in part on good relations with corporate stakehold-
ers, bolstered by an “open system” dialogue with them). 
 362. PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH 327 (1992). Selznick’s 
use of “internal morality” is similar to Gunningham and Rees’s use of “indus-
trial morality.” Compare id., with Gunningham & Rees, supra note 361, at 
376. 
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the range of possible subjects for which the MBR regulatory 
program will work. An MBR approach to stress testing that 
seeks to foster increased mindfulness of stress and failure will 
only achieve regulatory objectives for those institutions that 
are willing to deliberate meaningfully on stress and failure. A 
precondition to an effective MBR regulatory initiative is there-
fore the development of an industrial morality, a process calling 
to mind to what Christine Parker refers to as the “institutional-
ization of responsibility.”363
B. AN INDUSTRIAL MORALITY OF QUANTITATIVE SKEPTICISM 
 The next section takes up the ques-
tion of what an appropriate industrial morality for deliberation-
oriented stress testing might look like. 
The regulation of deliberation-oriented stress testing is, at 
bottom, about influencing the moral character of financial insti-
tutions so that they maintain capital at levels sufficient to en-
sure resilient performance during periods of stress.364 Such an 
orientation recognizes that risk management techniques will 
only work if attention is paid to the organizational environment 
within which they operate.365
  As applied to institutions, “character” is a broader idea than “cul-
ture.” Culture is the symbolic expression of shared perception, valua-
tion, and belief. Therefore the idea of “organizational culture” proper-
ly emphasizes the creation of common understandings regarding 
purpose and policy. The character of an organization includes its cul-
ture, but something more as well. A pattern of dependency—for ex-
ample, on a specific labor force, a market, or particular suppliers—
 But what does it mean to speak of 
an institution’s character? Selznick’s discussion of institutional 
character is instructive: 
 
 363. See PARKER, supra note 10, at 61 (“The success of corporate regulation 
depends crucially on a corporation’s ability to institutionalize responsibility.”). 
 364. See GRP. OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINAN-
CIAL STABILITY 43 (2009) (“Regulators will need to encourage banks to inter-
nalize [the] discipline [of maintaining adequate capitalization during expan-
sion periods] by requiring capital management policies to be tied to careful 
analysis of what stress scenarios imply about capital needs.”). 
 365. See C.F. LARRY HEIMANN, ACCEPTABLE RISKS 1 (1997) (“[O]rgan-
izational and technological failures have become intimately linked so that to 
fully understand the cause of most major accidents, we must analyze both the 
administrative and technical aspects of the situation.”); PARKER, supra note 
10, at 83 (“[T]o get at behaviour within the organization means changing the 
balance of external influences vying for management attention, so that social 
and legal responsibilities get a higher priority.”); DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHAL-
LENGER LAUNCH DECISION 67 (1996) (“Decision making in organizations is al-
ways affected by how information is sent and received, the characteristics of 
that information, and how it is interpreted by the individuals who send and 
receive it.”). 
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may have little to do with symbolism or belief. The character of a 
company or a trade union owes much to the structure of the industry, 
the skills of employees or members, the alliances that can be fash-
ioned, and many other practical limits and opportunities. Attitudes 
and beliefs account for only part of an organization’s distinctive char-
acter. 
. . . “Character” refers to the commitments that help to determine the 
kinds of tasks an organization takes on, the opportunities it creates or 
closes off, the priorities it sets, and the abuses to which it is prone. . . . 
We cannot presume that every organization has a definite character. 
When one does, however, we can usually identify premises that fix, 
for substantial periods, the association’s operative goals and charac-
teristic methods.366
A key aspect of the corporate governance of financial 
firms—using this term broadly to include not only legal docu-
ments and roles but also attitudinal settings, discursive prac-
tices, unspoken norms, and patterns of social influence within 
firms—is the degree of attention that firm managers devote to 
deliberating on the possibilities of stress and failure.
 
367 Mana-
gerial attention to these matters is determined in large part by 
patterns of social influence and the “intentional and uninten-
tional usage of language to frame [issues]” within firms.368 The-
se corporate governance systems are heterogeneous and subject 
to constant change.369
Once this point is admitted, then the logic of MBR emerges 
in clearer relief. One of the principal virtues of MBR is that it 
facilitates learning by regulators, who are able to intervene in 
that planning stage to identify the best practices of high-
performing firms and present those practices prospectively as 
standards to lower-performing firms.
 Some of these systems accommodate a 
meaningful deliberation on stress and failure better than oth-
ers. With MBR, these systems become a proper subject for 
regulatory influence and control as the main structural pillar of 
an attempt to shape institutional character and industrial mo-
rality.  
370
 
 366. SELZNICK, supra note 
 It connects administra-
tive law and regulation directly to the learning that occurs on 
362, at 321–22. 
 367. Cf. POWER, supra note 168, at 10 (arguing that corporate governance 
norms themselves are “a risk management strategy for a distinctive kind of 
risk—the failure of senior management to prevent risk incubation”). 
 368. See Jane E. Dutton, Strategic Agenda Building in Organizations, in 
ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING 81, 89–90 (Zur Shapira ed., 1997). 
 369. Cf. id. at 86–99 (discussing the various intersecting forces that can 
affect agenda-setting by corporate decision makers). 
 370. See supra note 353 and accompanying text. 
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the ground at the industry level.371 Again, the pragmatist influ-
ence is apparent.372 Deliberation-oriented stress testing regula-
tory programs should be conceptualized as efforts to shape in-
dustrial morality, on a rolling basis, by encouraging firms to 
continuously evolve and improve the way they produce and 
process information concerning the risk of stress and failure. In 
this way, the extent of the corporate deliberation on safety and 
failure is no longer determined by any fixed statutory or regu-
latory standard and is instead set by a dynamic and dialogic in-
teraction between industry and regulators over what are the 
best standards of failure awareness.373
Having banks conduct regular evaluations of their positions relative 
to a set of common scenarios (provided by the authorities) would be an 
improvement on current practices in several respects. First, it would 
allow some degree of benchmarking of results across institutions; se-
cond, it would allow a degree of benchmarking, and hence peer re-
view, of models; and third, it would hopefully help in ensuring stress-
testing exercises form an input to management decisions and are not 
an annual regulatory ritual.
 Andrew Haldane of the 
Bank of England makes this point with regard to the regulation 
of stress testing:  
374
In this way, regulators can use information learned from 
industry to direct supervisory resources in a risk-responsive 
manner, focusing on bad actors and slow movers.
 
375
 
 371. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 
 
346, at 350–51. 
 372. See supra notes 353–54 and accompanying text. 
 373. Joseph Rees notes that, after Three Mile Island, nuclear power opera-
tors channeled their institutional resources away from compliance with Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission rules and toward achieving “standards of excel-
lence.” See REES, supra note 14, at 1–2, 20–21. 
 374. Why Banks Failed the Stress Test, supra note 170, at 8 (emphasis 
added). There is some evidence that regulators were aware of this benefit of 
horizontal review, though their track record in harnessing the benefit has 
been poor. See Lessons Learned in Risk Management Oversight at Federal Fi-
nancial Regulators: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 14 (2009) (statement 
of Roger T. Cole, Director, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (“[T]here was a significant 
opportunity to put pressure on the big firms to improve their ability to pull po-
sitions together on a firm-wide basis and develop a really robust stress 
test. . . . We used that as a major tool in terms of pushing on those firms. It 
was feedback from that exercise and saying, look, you need to do more here, 
and that is one of the main tools that we have, is that type of horizontal re-
view.”). 
 375. Cf. Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, Really Responsive Risk-Based Reg-
ulation, 32 LAW & POL’Y 181, 181 (2010) (“These are collections of strategies 
that, at the very least, involve the targeting of enforcement resources on the 
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There is a further, somewhat counterintuitive, advantage 
of these rolling best practices regimes: they also create econom-
ic incentives for those firms with institutional characters pre-
disposed to promote regulatory objectives to innovate their 
practices. If, for instance, Bank of Prudence communicates to 
regulators a new stress test that, for the first time, takes seri-
ously the possible linkages between leveraged loans and repo 
funding ability, regulators might insist that Bank of Hazard 
and other less mindful banks conduct the same test and consid-
er the results’ implications. Bank of Prudence indirectly initi-
ates a conversation between the bank regulator and Bank of 
Hazard concerning risks that the latter might have been avoid-
ing altogether, perhaps in the process taking market share 
away from Bank of Prudence and even contributing to systemic 
risk in the financial system.376
In performing this exercise, regulators are not working 
from a tabula rasa. Financial firms already have distinctive in-
stitutional characters within their risk management depart-
ments, upper echelons of management, and boards of directors. 
’Mikes’ field research into risk management practices at large 
financial firms, discussed above in Part II.B, is relevant here. 
She found that two prevailing “calculative cultures” predomi-
nate within financial firm risk management departments: 
quantitative enthusiasm and quantitative skepticism.
  
377 Quan-
titative skeptics consider risk measurements as trend indica-
tors to be taken into consideration alongside qualitative criteria 
such as “managerial discretion, experience and judgment.”378 
They use quantitative models as “learning tool[s]” in multi-
factor judgment processes rather than as an “answering ma-
chine.”379 For them, “risk control is akin to a devil’s advocate 
system, to be mobilized in order to challenge taken-for-granted 
assumptions and foster organizational learning.”380
Mikes found further that the salience of the role of risk 
management in firm corporate governance depended in large 
part on the extent to which risk managers aligned their tech-
nical capabilities with the predominant calculative culture 
  
 
basis of assessments of the risks that a regulated person or firm poses to the 
regulator’s objectives.”). 
 376. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 346, at 350–51. 
 377. Mikes, supra note 56, at 22. 
 378. Mikes, supra note 57, at 15.  
 379. See Mikes, supra note 56, at 35–36. 
 380. Id. at 22. 
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within their respective firms.381 In quantitatively skeptical 
firms, risk management personnel exert greater influence over 
agenda setting and key strategic decision making.382 Such firms 
conceptualize “risk” in broad enough terms to include not simp-
ly measureable uncertainty but any threatening event irrespec-
tive of its ability to be measured.383 Because they had infor-
mation—albeit at times non-quantifiable information—
concerning such risks that senior management valued, risk 
managers were expected to discuss them.384 On the other hand, 
in quantitatively enthusiastic firms, risk managers were una-
ble to impact big-picture strategy but were able to marshal 
quantitative risk estimates to influence already-existing de-
bates about how to allocate capital in the firm.385 Quantitatively 
enthusiastic management demands quantifiable risk estimates 
as the key building blocks of an “economic capital” managerial 
system that adjusts the profitability of business lines according 
to the risks they posed.386 Senior management instructs risk 
managers to quantify risk so as to “induce correct economic be-
haviour” in light of the firm’s goals.387
From the perspective of stress test planning, not all calcu-
lative cultures are equal. There are several reasons why delib-
eration-oriented stress testing is more likely to flourish in 
quantitatively skeptical risk management departments. The 
first reason flows from the conceptual roots of stress testing in 
the study of failure.
  
388
 
 381. Id. at 37. Mikes builds on Anish Bhimani’s earlier work finding that 
the perceived success of a management information system depends on 
whether the cultural premise of a new system is aligned with the predilections 
of the intended users of the new system approach. Id. at 21. 
 A firm’s orientation to failure is neces-
sarily a strategic issue. On account of the correlation between 
quantitative skepticism and risk managers’ participation in 
strategic decision making, regulators should encourage quanti-
tative skepticism. That is to say, risk managers, who are re-
sponsible for conceiving of and implementing stress testing 
programs, will have access to board-level attention. A second, 
but related, reason flows from the fact that deliberation-
oriented stress testing requires an encounter with non-
 382. Id. at 28. 
 383. Id. at 35.  
 384. Id. at 29.  
 385. Id. at 34.  
 386. Id. at 24, 32. 
 387. Id. at 31. 
 388. See supra Part I.A.  
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quantifiable uncertainty that quantitative skeptics are better 
positioned to perform. A third reason is that by demanding pre-
cise calculation outputs, quantitative enthusiasts are inclined 
to orient towards assurance-oriented stress testing and fur-
thermore make unavailable several of the types of stress test-
ing exercises highlighted above, such as war games and reverse 
stress tests. 
C. HIGH-RELIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS: REGULATORS ALREADY 
HAVE PROTOTYPES AND NEED NOT CREATE ANYTHING NEW 
In using MBR to foster the quantitative skepticism condu-
cive to deliberation-oriented stress testing, regulators have 
other institutional models from which to draw. In particular, 
management researchers have identified a category of so called 
“high reliability organizations” (HROs) that are characterized 
by their aspiration of complete failure avoidance and their 
commitment to resilient performance in conditions of uncer-
tainty and stress.389 Since an MBR regulatory program to en-
courage deliberation-oriented stress testing touches directly on 
the concept of failure, the relevance of HROs in this context is 
readily apparent. Remember that the conceptual roots of stress 
testing and stress analysis are found in the search to better 
understand the network of causes out of which failure might 
result. In fact, we have already seen how one branch of engi-
neering—systems reliability analysis—expressly directs itself 
to the concept of reliability.390
Examples of HROs include nuclear power plants, aircraft 
carriers, wildfire-fighting crews, disease control authorities, 
and air traffic control systems.
 In the brief description of HROs 
that follows, bear in mind how HROs focus on the causes of 
failure. 
391 The decisional infrastructures 
of these organizations prize reliable performance because fail-
ure—e.g., a nuclear power plant meltdown or a mid-air collision 
of commercial jetliners—is catastrophic from the perspective of 
managers.392 Financial regulators therefore would do well to 
look to the institutional character-morality of HROs.393
 
 389. See Rijpma, supra note 
 
14, at 39. 
 390. See supra Part I.B. 
 391. WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 14, at ix. 
 392. See id. at ix–x. 
 393. It might be objected that the analogy to financial institutions is not 
complete because the tolerance of failure for financial institutions in general is 
low but not zero. Making banks completely failsafe would also ensure that the 
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Kathleen Sutcliffe and Karl Weick individuate the follow-
ing five attributes of HROs: (1) they are preoccupied with the 
possibility of failure; (2) they are reluctant to accept simple ex-
planations; (3) they maintain sensitivity to actual conditions of 
operations; (4) they are committed to resilient performance that 
maintains dynamic stability even in the presence of continuous 
stress; and (5) they are non-hierarchical and defer to expertise 
wherever it is located.394 The authors label the first three at-
tributes “principles of anticipation” and the latter two attrib-
utes “principles of containment.”395
The three principles of anticipation are relevant to deliber-
ation-oriented stress testing because stress analysis is at bot-
tom a diagnostic tool—it identifies rather than fixes prob-
lems.
 
396 Recall that risk management is about identifying 
threats to desired objectives and taking steps to control them; 
stress testing is only concerned with the former task.397 Sut-
cliffe and Weick discuss anticipation in terms with which sce-
nario analysts at banks would be well familiar: “To anticipate 
is to foresee or imagine an eventual unchecked outcome, based 
on small disparities [between observations and expecta-
tions].”398
Mindfulness . . . involves the combination of ongoing scrutiny of exist-
ing expectations, continuous refinement and differentiation of expec-
tations based on newer experiences, willingness and capability to in-
vent new expectations that make sense of unprecedented events, a 
more nuanced appreciation of context and ways to deal with it, and 
identification of new dimensions of context that improve foresight and 
current functioning. . . . Mindfulness is focused on clear and detailed 
 They further use the concept of mindfulness to illus-
trate how these principles contribute to the distinctive institu-
tional character of HROs: 
 
banks would be of little use to savers and borrowers. Cf. COUNTERPARTY RM 
GROUP REPORT, supra note 180, at 11 (“[S]tress tests, when combined with 
carefully constructed scenario analyses, can be helpful, but even under the 
best of circumstances, stress tests can never anticipate how future events will 
unfold unless such tests are so extreme as to postulate outcomes that no level 
of capital or liquidity will provide protections against potential failure.”). A 
privatized system of finance necessarily entails that financial institutions en-
gage in risk-taking and therefore will be subject to some non-trivial possibility 
of failure. Nevertheless, policymakers’ failure tolerance approaches zero for 
systemically significant financial institutions whose failure could cause the 
core functions of the financial system to collapse.  
 394. See WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 14, at 8–17 (discussing the at-
tributes of HROs). 
 395. See id. at 63–64, 81–82. 
 396. See id. at 63–64 (summarizing the anticipation principles). 
 397. See supra notes 47–58 and accompanying text. 
 398. WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 14, at 45. 
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comprehension of emerging threats and on factors that interfere with 
such comprehension. Small failures have to be noticed (the principle 
of preoccupation with failure), and their distinctiveness must be re-
tained rather than lost in a category (reluctance to simplify). People 
need to remain aware of ongoing operations if they want to notice nu-
ances that could be symptoms of failure (sensitivity to operations).399
As discussed at length above, risk management depart-
ments use VaR techniques and stress tests to form expectations 
about risk, loss, and failure in an uncertain economic future.
 
400 
These expectations about risk largely determine how capital is 
allocated throughout the corporate group and also contribute to 
strategic agenda setting.401 But Sutcliffe and Weick note that 
expectations are a “mixed blessing” because they create “blind 
spots,” by which they mean “belated recognition of unexpected, 
threatening events.”402
They note further that our ability to update our expecta-
tions in light of new information is frustrated by the “disquali-
fication heuristic,” which describes our tendency to disqualify 
disconfirming information, highlight confirming information, 
and neglect information that contradicts convictions.
  
403 The 
disqualification heuristic is related to the so-called “overconfi-
dence bias,” “hindsight bias,” and “outcome bias.”404 The over-
confidence bias describes our tendency to have inflated subjec-
tive perceptions of correctness.405 The hindsight bias refers to 
our tendency to overestimate the amount of information we 
deem relevant at the time we made a decision.406 The outcome 
bias describes our demonstrated tendency to evaluate events in 
ways that are anchored on observed outcomes.407
 
 399. See id. at 32–33.  
 These deci-
 400. See supra Part II.B. 
 401. See supra notes 381–87 and accompanying text. 
 402. WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 14, at 23. 
 403. See Lee Clarke, The Disqualification Heuristic: When Do Organiza-
tions Misperceive Risk?, 5 RES. SOC. PROBLEMS & PUB. POL’Y 289 (1993). 
 404. Cf. id. at 299–301 (discussing how the disqualification heuristic leads 
to biased risk assessment). 
 405. See Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Calibration of Probabilities: The State of 
the Art to 1980, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 
306, 314 (Daniel Kahneman et al, eds., 1982) (“The most pervasive finding in 
recent research is that people are overconfident with general-knowledge items 
of moderate or extreme difficulty.”). 
 406. See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome 
Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: 
HUMAN PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975). 
 407. See Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision 
Evaluation, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569, 569 (1988). 
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sional pathologies have obvious negative effects on institutional 
learning with the familiar result that key corporate decision 
makers overlook accumulating evidence of anomalies, overes-
timate the validity of their expectations, and even struggle to 
distinguish narrowly-avoided catastrophe from outright suc-
cesses.408 Barry Turner and’ Nick Pidgeon’s “disaster incubation 
theory” formalizes these decisional pathologies and shortcuts 
into an organizational theory: weak signals of disaster are ig-
nored during a latent phase of “disaster incubation” before 
pushing systems into disaster modes.409
These decisional phenomena explain our demonstrated 
tendencies to normalize unanticipated deviations from our ex-
pectations—even when they may be weak signals of impending 
catastrophe. HROs counteract this tendency by seeking instead 
to continuously problematize and anomalize the unexpected.
 
410
 
 408. See WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 
 
For instance, the military and U.S. intelligence community use 
14, at 26. 
 409. See BARRY A. TURNER & NICK F. PIDGEON, MAN-MADE DISASTERS (2d 
ed. 1997). Other researchers of disasters and failures object that any systemat-
ic effort to discover weak signals of impending failure is bound to fail for com-
plex systems such as the financial system, and its constitutive institutions and 
their portfolios. See, e.g., CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH 
HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES 4–5 (2d ed. 1999) (suggesting failure is inevitable 
in most complex systems); Weber, supra note 10, at 665–704 (explaining why 
the financial system is complex in light of, among other things, Perrow’s nor-
mal accident theory). To these theorists, every complex system already carries 
the seeds of a failure—or, to use Perrow’s phrase, a “normal accident”—that 
will come to pass in a manner that defies ex ante prediction. See PERROW, su-
pra at 4–5 (discussing the unpredictability of failures in complex systems). The 
events that HRO theorists point out as harbingers of disaster are only signals 
in hindsight. See id. Notwithstanding the emphasis on HROs in this Section, 
this Article avoids weighing in on either side of that debate. I have argued 
elsewhere that the financial system is in fact vulnerable to normal accidents 
and that the most effective way to counteract those vulnerabilities is to em-
bark on structural reform of the sector. See Weber, supra note 10, at 710 (sug-
gesting structural reforms). Instead, the Article undertakes an analysis of the 
uses to which stress testing may be put and makes recommendations for their 
implementation as a regulatory matter. In other words, it argues that deliber-
ation-oriented stress testing is more likely to be successful if regulators en-
courage firms to adopt it as a method inspired by HROs; it stops well short, 
however, of presenting deliberation-oriented stress testing as a panacea for 
financial instability. 
 410. See WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 14, at 41–42. A related discipline 
of near-miss incident management attempts to design a systematic program 
for recognizing near-misses as signs of operational failure and learning from 
them. See James R. Phimister et al., Near-Miss Incident Management in the 
Chemical Process Industry, 23 RISK ANALYSIS 445, 446–47 (2003) (proposing a 
framework consisting of identification, reporting, prioritization/distribution, 
causal analysis, solution identification, dissemination, and resolution). 
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a so-called “red team” in operations planning to do just that.411 
The red team is responsible for playing devil’s advocate during 
planning sessions, directly challenging conventional wisdom 
and existing plans, using “what if” types of questions to find 
flaws in decisions, forecast, or intelligence information.412 In 
other words, they do the opposite of what Admiral Ugaki did in 
the war games leading up to the Battle of Midway, with cata-
strophic results for the Japanese fleet.413
Other frequent reference points in the HRO literature are 
the linkages between the institutional character of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the high-
profile failures of the Challenger and Columbia space shut-
tles.
 
414 The post-accident commissions charged with investigat-
ing the disasters framed their reports as answering nearly 
identical queries: why did NASA go ahead with the launches 
despite knowledge of serious problems and despite concerns of 
engineers?415 In other words, what inhibited NASA from learn-
ing about failure from the accumulation of weak signals of 
stress? This is an inquiry into how NASA’s institutional char-
acter lacked an appropriate commitment to mindfulness of the 
risks of failure.416
Diane Vaughan’s study of the 1986 Challenger disaster 
highlights how NASA failed to learn from weak signals of the 
problem that ultimately resulted in the shuttle’s catastrophic 
failure.
 
417
 
 411. See BREMMER & KEAT, supra note 
 The immediate cause of the explosion was a faulty 
design in the O-ring that sealed the joints of the solid rocket 
123, at 25. 
 412. See id. 
 413. See supra note 133 and accompanying text for a discussion of how 
Ugaki introduced bias into the results of the game, thereby reducing its infor-
mation value. 
 414. See generally VAUGHAN, supra note 365 (discussing the institutions at 
NASA and the space shuttle disasters). 
 415. See COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BD., REPORT VOLUME I, at 
195 (2003), available at http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html 
[hereinafter COLUMBIA REPORT] (also discussing the Challenger commission 
report). 
 416. Id. at 177 (“Many accident investigations make the same mistake in 
defining causes. They identify the widget that broke or malfunctioned, then 
locate the person most closely connected with the technical failure . . . . When 
causal chains are limited to technical flaws and individual failures, the ensu-
ing responses aimed at preventing a similar event in the future are equally 
limited . . . .”). 
 417. See VAUGHAN, supra note 365, at 124–43 (discussing the events lead-
ing up to the challenger explosion). 
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boosters.418 The O-rings allowed leakage of hot propellant gas to 
breach the joint and eventually ignite the liquid hydrogen and 
oxygen in the external fuel tank.419 Vaughan’s study finds that 
evidence of the design errors had been discovered during test 
flights, discussed, and reported on by NASA contractor working 
groups.420 In their institutional response to this information, 
the working groups “normalized” the deviance of the experience 
from their expectations.421 By normalization of deviance 
Vaughan refers to the process by which “behavior the work 
group first identified as technical deviation was subsequently 
reinterpreted as within the norm for acceptable joint perfor-
mance, then finally officially labeled an acceptable risk.”422
A similar normalization of deviance occurred in the lead-up 
to the disastrous 2003 Columbia shuttle mission. The technical 
cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the 
so-called “Thermal Protection System” on the leading edge of 
the left wing, caused by a piece of insulating foam that had 
separated from an external fuel tank shortly after launch and 
struck the shuttle’s wing.
 
423
During re-entry this breach in the Thermal Protection System “al-
lowed superheated air to penetrate through the leading edge insula-
tion and progressively melt the aluminum structure of the left wing, 
resulting in a weakening of the structure until increasing aerodynam-
ic forces caused loss of control, failure of the wing, and breakup of the 
[shuttle].”
  
424
Foam-shedding had occurred repeatedly in NASA space 
shuttle losses, and had been consistently labeled an “In-Flight 
Anomaly,” which required a specific NASA organization to re-
solve the problem or convince NASA that it did not pose a 
threat to the crew.
 
425 NASA managers would then remove the 
designation as corrective measures were taken, but the prob-
lem kept recurring.426
 
 418. Id. at xi. 
 When a major foam-shedding event took 
 419. Id. 
 420. See id. at 119–25 (discussing NASA’s work groups). 
 421. Id. at 65.  
 422. Id. Vaughan identifies a recurring five-stage process in the work 
group’s processing of information about erosion of the O-ring: (1) signals of po-
tential danger; (2) official act acknowledging escalated risk; (3) review of evi-
dence; (4) official act indicating the normalization of deviance: accepting risk; 
and (5) shuttle launch. Id.  
 423. COLUMBIA REPORT, supra note 415, at 9. 
 424. Id. 
 425. Id. at 123. 
 426. Id. at 196. 
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place in 2002—a year before the fatal Columbia launch—NASA 
managers downgraded it to the status of an “action item.”427 
The board charged with investigating the accident expressly 
tied NASA’s institutional failures to those failures in the lead-
up to the earlier Challenger launch.428 The institutional similar-
ities between the accidents are striking: “In all official engi-
neering analyses and launch recommendations prior to the ac-
cidents, evidence that the design was not performing as 
expected was reinterpreted as acceptable and non-deviant, 
which diminished perceptions of risk throughout the agency.”429
Robin Dillon and Catherine Tinsley use the Columbia trag-
edy as an illustration of a more general phenomenon concern-
ing why weak signals of failure, which they term “near misses,” 
are rarely treated as presages of future failure worthy of tar-
geted further inquiry.
  
430 In their view, NASA managers pro-
cessed the information of foam-shedding in a manner that ac-
tually decreased their awareness of risk.431 Consequently, that 
lower sense of perceived risk encouraged future riskier choic-
es—i.e., to continue with the shuttle launch despite further 
revelations of risk.432 “Hence, “NASA managers contemporane-
ously accounted for, but failed to learn from, near-misses.”433
The propensity of an event can be distinguished from its 
disposition by reference to the concept of the “close counterfac-
 So 
how is it possible that learning of weak signals of failure de-
creased rather than increased subjective risk perceptions? Dil-
lon and Tinsley hypothesize that the explanation lies in the dif-
ference between propensities and dispositions.  
 
 427. Id. 
 428. See id. at 195 (drawing parallels between the explosions). Overall, the 
2003 commission report’s description of NASA’s institutional character reads 
like a tutorial on how not to be an HRO. It decries an unjustifiably optimistic 
safety culture (i.e., no preoccupation with failure), id. at 180, consistent pref-
erences for oversimplified explanations (i.e., no reluctance to simplify), id. at 
181, and a rigid and hierarchical organizational structure within the mission 
management team that impeded the communication of information (i.e., no 
deference to expertise). Id. at 192 (discussing experts’ reluctance to speak). 
 429. Id. at 196.  
 430. See Dillon & Tinsley, supra note 11, at 1425–26 (discussing the treat-
ment of near misses). 
 431. Id. at 1426.  
 432. Id.; see Matthew N. McMullen & Keith D. Markman, Downward 
Counterfactuals and Motivation: The Wake-Up Call and the Pangloss Effect, 
26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 575, 581–83 (2000) (describing this 
phenomenon as the “Pangloss effect”). 
 433. Dillon & Tinsley, supra note 11, at 1426. 
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tual.”434 A close counterfactual exists where a subject affirms 
that the counterfactual outcome “almost” occurred—instead of 
merely affirming the counterfactual outcome “could have” oc-
curred.435 Disposition refers to the subjectively understood sta-
tistical probability of an event occurring based on prior rate in-
formation.436 Propensity, by contrast, refers to the subjective 
perception of probability supplemented by event cues that sub-
jectively tie the counterfactual outcome causally to the actions 
taken.437 To illustrate, consider the following scenario developed 
by Daniel Kahneman and Carol Varey to illustrate this point: 
“At the end of a long game of chance, John could have won the 
whole pot if a die that he rolled showed a six. The die that he 
rolled was loaded to show six 80% of the time. John rolled it 
and it showed a two.“438 When research subjects were prompted 
with subjects the close counterfactual “The die almost rolled a 
six,” they rejected it decisively.439 However, they largely accept-
ed the close counterfactual “John almost won the whole pot.”440 
The results show how subjective understanding of probability 
depends in part on information that does not impact objective 
probability at all. The key factor is whether event cues situate 
the information according to a causal script.441
Dillon and Tinsley apply the insight into the risk discus-
sion by inquiring into how near-misses affect perceptions of 
risk.
  
442 Near-misses can prompt either serious deliberation and 
updated probability assessments or they can be celebrated as 
evidence corroborating the robustness and safety of the existing 
state of affairs.443
 
 434. See Daniel Kahneman & Carol A. Varey, Propensities and Counterfac-
tuals: The Loser That Almost Won, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1101, 
1101 (1990). 
 The researchers found strong support for the 
 435. Id.  
 436. Id. at 1102. 
 437. See id. at 1104–05 (distinguishing close counterfactuals from propen-
sities). 
 438. Id. at 1104.  
 439. Id.  
 440. Id. 
 441. See id. Two key factors impacting the existence of event cues are prox-
imity and decisiveness. See id. at 1106–07. 
 442. Dillon & Tinsley, supra note 11, at 1430. 
 443. See Dillon & Tinsley, supra note 11, at 1430; Adam J. Hirsch & Grego-
ry Mitchell, Law and Proximity, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 557, 569–70 (“In situa-
tions where assimilation [of the close call to the narrowly-avoided bad out-
come] is likely to induce fright, a close call . . . acts as a ‘wake up call.’ But, in 
those instances where it instead prompts contrast, and so induces relief, a 
close call can cause complacency and thus impair learning.”). 
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hypothesis that near-misses are interpreted in a favorable 
light, decrease perceived risk, and encourage risky behavior.444 
They conjecture that the increased risk tolerance is due to the 
absence of event cues connecting the near-miss to proximal 
failure.445 People adjust downward their subjective perceptions 
of risk as they weave a causal script linking the near-miss to 
non-failure rather than to failure.446
The Dillon-Tinsley results are worrisome from the perspec-
tive of financial regulators. They also enhance the case for HRO 
principles. Given the highly competitive environment in which 
modern financial institutions operate, the tendency to normal-
ize deviant events (i.e., weak signals of failure such as localized 
pockets of increasing loan delinquency or market rumors of li-
quidity concerns) results in a failure to relate the event to a 
causal script involving the possibility of failure. It is easy to 
imagine how this plays out in the construction of VaR models, 
sensitivity analysis, and stress scenarios: in the relative quies-
cence of present market conditions, market anomalies are nor-
malized or, worse still, interpreted as signs of the robustness of 
the same quiescent conditions. This is a familiar story of how—
despite the enormous resources devoted to developing the “so-
phisticated” risk management systems—clusters of weak sig-
nals of impending catastrophe become blind spots and go un-
heeded by risk managers, executives, and directors.  
  
One of the central challenges in implementing an effective 
deliberation-oriented stress testing regime is therefore how to 
problematize deviations from expectations so as to enable them 
to, among other things, more readily construct causal scripts 
leading to failure. The commission that investigated the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks impliedly invoked HRO prin-
ciples in a discussion of how to prevent catastrophic attacks on 
major domestic infrastructure, insisting that governmental 
agencies “routiniz[e], even bureaucratiz[e], the exercise of im-
agination.”447
 
 444. See Dillon & Tinsley, supra note 
  
11, at 1431–36. 
 445. Id. at 1431. 
 446. See id. at 1433–34. 
 447. 9-11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 16, at 344. One commissioner clari-
fied that “you don't really institutionalize imagination” so much as “you put in 
place systems that allow the imagination that’s naturally occurring to actually 
break through.” Jena McGregor, The Gospels of Failure, FAST COMPANY, 
http://www.fastcompany.com/52512/gospels-failure (last visited Apr. 21, 2014) 
(quoting Jamie Gorelick). 
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But what sort of imagination concerning stress should be 
encouraged? Research into the psychology of proximity has 
demonstrated that proximity is a decisive factor in determining 
how an event is processed: “as proximity to calamity or success 
increases, the likelihood of strong reactions to the ultimate out-
come increases, counterfactual dwelling on ways the outcome 
could have been altered increases, and behavioral changes are 
more likely to follow, especially with respect to potentially re-
peatable outcomes.”448
Conceptually, deliberation-oriented stress testing should 
have greater success in achieving financial stability where risk 
managers experience failure as a psychologically proximate 
event. But that is just to re-state the problem: the key question 
from an MBR perspective is how to encourage such associa-
tions. Mindful HROs provide examples to which financial firms, 
prodded by regulators, should aspire.  
  
One small note is in order concerning a large problem: that 
of incentives. So far, this discussion of HROs has elided consid-
erations of economic motivations to cut expenses and grow rev-
enue: devoting resources to the three principles of anticipa-
tion—attentiveness to weak signals of disaster as harbingers of 
failure, skepticism with respect to expectations and rules of 
thumb, and reluctance to simplify—is costly. The sort of mind-
ful operations and planning culture that pervades HROs un-
dercuts the usefulness of heuristics and routines that usually 
do the job right and save time and resources. Even more im-
portantly, allowing for mindfulness and the principles of antic-
ipation to control capital allocation in a diversified financial 
conglomerate is costly, especially considering the intense com-
petition in the industry. 
It should be noted that most of the organizations high-
lighted by the HRO literature are governmental units or utili-
ties that receive some protection from market competition.449
 
 448. Hirsch & Mitchell, supra note 
 
And even with these entities, HRO management does not arise 
naturally. Rees has observed that only when the nuclear power 
443, at 570. 
 449. See supra note 394. One notable private sector HRO noted by Sutcliffe 
and Weick is the courier FedEx’s Global Operations Control Unit, which man-
ages a “sweep network” of FedEx airplanes. See WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra 
note 14, at 70–71. Every evening, twenty or so FedEx airplanes leave their de-
parture points only 60% full so as to permit them to re-route in order to pick 
up unanticipated cargo and ensure that FedEx is able to meet its promised ob-
ligations without exceptions. Consequently, FedEx achieves added resiliency 
by maintaining slack in its operations. Id.  
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utilities realized in the aftermath of Three Mile Island incident 
that their future viability depended on industry-wide reliabil-
ity—that they were “hostages of each other”—did an industrial 
morality develop to motivate a commitment to high reliabil-
ity.450 It should not surprise that purely private-sector HROs 
are rare. One example of a private-sector, HRO-like operation 
is the Toyota production system (TPS).451 This distinctive pro-
duction system, long the subject of management studies, starts 
from a set of shared commitments to trust, zero tolerance for 
defects, continuous improvement (kaizen), and the indetermi-
nate value of “quality” that is subject to continuous reevalua-
tion in light of new circumstances.452 In furtherance of these 
commitments, TPS espouses decentralized and collaborative 
decision making, deliberate destabilization of routines to facili-
tate learning, and a commitment to analyzing any failures to 
their root causes.453 When an unexpected problem occurs on the 
assembly line, workers have the power to pull the “andon cord” 
that halts production at the entire plant so that the anomaly 
can be examined and discussed.454
Though the parallels to HRO principles are evident, recent 
revelations of product defects and subsequent recalls call into 
question the ability of Toyota, or any private industrial con-
cern, to remain committed to such principles in the face of 
pressures to cut costs and grow revenues and margins.
 
455
 
 450. See generally REES, supra note 
 These 
private sector realities underscore the need for regulators to 
take an active role not only in overseeing the scenarios, but also 
shaping the industrial morality. This will necessarily entail 
14 (discussing how nuclear industry 
operations have changed since the Three Mile Island incident on account of 
more effective self-regulation). 
 451. See Simon, supra note 353, at 45–47. 
 452. See id. 
 453. See id. at 45–55. 
 454. Id. at 45. 
 455. Current Toyota CEO Akio Toyoda has stated that market pressures 
caused Toyota’s priorities to “bec[o]me confused,” leading Toyota to accelerate 
production too quickly for company engineers to ensure quality commitment 
as much of the work was outsourced to suppliers. See Alan Ohnsman et al., 
Toyota Recall Crisis Said to Lie in Cost Cuts, Growth Ambitions, BLOOMBERG, 
Feb. 26, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid= 
aF0aX8t0Q6lk. 
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heightened regulatory engagement during examinations with 
both risk managers and senior executives.456
All this is not to say that regulators should abandon the 
use of MBR regulatory tools to foster deliberation-oriented 
stress testing, but rather that in implementing such a program, 
they should be willing to see cost-cutting and imprudent use of 
leverage or expansion of revenue as part of the problem that 
needs solving. The results of these tests can be taken into con-
sideration during the bank examination process.
 
457 Although 
this Article stops well short of advocating for regulatory alloca-
tion of credit, a shift towards a more hands-on engagement of 
questions of risk assessment by regulators befits the regulation 
of an industry that, like the utilities that historically have been 
subject to regulatory price setting at the retail level, is respon-
sible for key economic infrastructure without which the econo-
my cannot properly function. It is time to take seriously the no-
tion of the utility function of financial institutions.458
 CONCLUSION  
 
Although stress analysis is a parvenu in the bank regula-
tory regime, it has a long history in the engineering field from 
as early as the sixteenth century. These early stress testing 
methodologies evolved into professional norms on the part of 
engineers to remain focused on worst-case scenarios when de-
 
 456. Cf. Why Banks Failed the Stress Test, supra note 170, at 9 (“In the 
arm-wrestle with management, it is about supplying power to the elbow of 
risk-managers.”). 
 457. U.S. bank regulators subject large banks to a continuous supervision 
regime. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMP-
TROLLER’S HANDBOOK: LARGE BANK SUPERVISION 17–21 (2010) (explaining 
that examination of large banks involves a periodic core assessment that cul-
minates in a report from the OCC to the bank’s board of directors as well as 
“various ongoing supervisory activities” and “targeted examinations”—i.e., in-
tegrated risk assessments by business or product line). Regulators usually rely 
on “the use of reason and moral suasion” as their “primary corrective tools.” 
FED. DEPOSIT. INS. CORP., RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POL-
ICIES § 15.1 (2010). The use of these soft persuasive tactics occurs under the 
shadow of bank regulators’ statutory powers (i) to order banks to remediate 
unsafe or unsound practices uncovered during examinations backed by speci-
fied and open-ended enforcement authority and (ii) to issue cease-and-desist 
orders with respect to unsafe or unsound practices. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(b), 
1831o (2012) (outlining the powers of bank regulators).  
 458. See generally John Kay, Narrow Banking: The Reform of Banking 
Regulation (Sept. 15, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www 
.johnkay.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/JK-Narrow-Banking.pdf (drawing 
the parallels between the financial system and utilities). 
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signing and building structures, materials, and systems. Fi-
nancial firms have adopted an extensive suite of stress testing 
techniques alongside their risk management systems. These 
techniques represent the most direct encounter with the con-
cept of failure by and among firm decision makers. Most of the 
discussion regarding stress testing, however, focuses too much 
on the mix of stress testing tools a firm uses and not enough on 
the decisional infrastructure of, or orientation towards, stress 
testing. While financial regulators and policymakers are right 
to conceive of stress testing as a proper subject of regulation, 
their conceptual understanding has lagged. In particular, their 
efforts from the late 1980s until today have largely considered 
stress tests as verification tools rather than as part of a delib-
erative, mindful institutional orientation towards failure- and 
stress-related information within the corporate governance in-
frastructure of regulated firms. The success of stress testing 
regulation will depend in large part on whether regulators shift 
their focus towards this latter model.  
 
